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Abstract	This	thesis	examines	the	functioning	of	the	Financial	Investigations	Panel	(FRIP)	as	 a	 mechanism	 of	 accountability	 in	 the	 South	 African	 financial	 reporting	environment.	Detailed	interviews	with	a	sample	of	technical	experts	are	used	to	reveal	 the	 significant	 source	 of	 coercive,	 normative	 and	 mimetic	 isomorphic	pressure	the	FRIP	is	able	to	exert,	acting	on	the	organisations	themselves,	as	well	as	on	the	individual	preparers	and	their	auditors.		This	 thesis	 provides	 the	 first	 account	 of	 how	 the	 FRIP	 is	 capable	 of	 exerting	institutional	 isomorphic	 pressure	 on	 organisations,	 those	 charged	 with	governance,	individual	preparers	and	external	auditors.	In	doing	so	the	research	contributes	to	the	limited	body	of	interpretive	corporate	governance	research	in	South	Africa,	offers	evidence	in	support	of	the	JSE’s	decision	to	establish	a	pro-active	monitoring	review	and,	finally,	offers	support	to	the	fact	that	South	African	corporate	reporting	requirements	can	be	enforced	and	are	not	just	symbolic.				
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1.	Introduction	
1.1	Purpose,	context	and	significance	of	the	study	Shareholder-centric	 models	 of	 corporate	 reporting	 have	 evolved	 to	 take	cognisance	of	the	broader	informational	needs	of	a	wide	group	of	users	(Institute	of	 Directors	 [IOD],	 2009;	 Solomon,	 2010;	 International	 Integreted	 Reporting	Council	 [IIRC],	 2011).	 Nevertheless,	 financial	 reporting	 is	 still	 of	 paramount	importance	 (International	Accounting	 Standards	Board	 [IASB],	 2010).	 In	 South	Africa,	 in	particular,	 companies	primarily	 listed	on	 the	 Johannesburg	Securities	Exchange	(JSE)	are	required	to	prepare	consolidated	financial	statements	which	comply	in	all	material	respects	with	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	(IFRS).	This	is	also	a	statutory	requirement,	designed	to	ensure	the	usefulness	of	the	financial	reporting	process	(Companies	Act,	2008;	JSE,	2013).		As	 a	 formal	 technical	 process,	 the	 preparation	 of	 financial	 statements	 is	 an	example	 of	 an	 ‘expert	 systems’	 (Unerman	 and	 O'Dwyer,	 2004).	 Financial	statements	 require	 a	 high	 level	 of	 technical	 expertise	 to	 complete	 (Integrated	Reporting	Committee	of	South	Africa	[IRCSA],	2011);	are	prepared	in	compliance	with	codes	of	best	practice	(IFRS)	and	are	designed	to	communicate	information	and	 conceptions	 of	 value	 over	 time	 (Rodrigues	 and	 Craig,	 2007;	 IASB,	 2010).	With	the	majority	of	users	unable	to	observe	directly	the	preparation	process	-	and	appreciate	every	technical	aspect	of	the	financial	statements	-	their	role	as	a	legitimate	 part	 of	 the	 corporate	 governance	 landscape	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	rational	 assumption	 that	 these	 documents	 have	 been	 prepared	 with	 due	 care	(Unerman	and	O'Dwyer,	2004;	Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	 2015).	One	 reason	 for	 the	‘faith’	 placed	 by	 non-experts	 in	 the	 utility	 of	 corporate	 reporting	 is	 the	proliferation	of	systems	of	checks	and	balances	designed	to	establish	a	sense	of	accountability,	 transparency	and	 ‘discipline	of	the	self’	on	the	part	of	preparers	of	these	reports	(Black,	2008;	Roberts,	2009).			Formalisation	 of	 codes	 of	 corporate	 governance	 (Solomon,	 2010);	 the	 use	 of	internal	 controls	 to	 ensure	 the	 accuracy	 of	 corporate	 reporting	 (International	
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Auditing	 and	Assurance	 Standards	Board	 [IAASB]	2009a);	 the	promulgation	of	the	Sarbanes	Oxley	Act	(SOX)	(Unerman	and	O'Dwyer,	2004);	and,	most	notably,	the	external	audit	 function	(Power,	1994)	are	each	examples	of	mechanisms	of	accountability	 designed	 to	 reassure	 non-expert	 users	 of	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	corporate	reporting	process	and,	indirectly,	of	the	capital	markets.			When	it	comes	to	the	financial	statements	being	prepared	by	companies	listed	on	the	 JSE,	 the	 Financial	 Reporting	 Investigations	 Committee	 (FRIP)	 is	 another	example	 of	 how	 technologies	 of	 accountability	 function	 in	 a	modern	 capitalist	system	 (Section	 2.1.2).	 Prior	 literature,	 however,	 frequently	 presents	 financial	reporting,	 and	 related	 quality	 control	 systems,	 as	 a	 rational	 technical	 function	supporting	 the	 maximisation	 of	 shareholder	 value	 (Watts	 and	 Zimmerman,	1978;	Carruthers,	1995).	Whether	or	not	formal	structures	are	able	to	achieve	a	sense	of	accountability	or	‘discipline	of	the	self’	has	not	been	examined	in	detail.	This	 is	 especially	 true	 in	 a	 South	 African	 setting	 where	 financial	 accounting	research	 has	 been	 dominated	 by	 a	 positivist	 epistemological	 focus	 (Maroun,	2012a).		As	a	result,	 the	purpose	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	add	to	 the	 limited	 local	 interpretive	accounting	research	which	draws	on	the	experiences	of	 individuals	to	highlight	how	 corporate	 reporting	 operates	 in	 the	 real	world	 (Broadbent	 and	Unerman,	2011;	 Maroun	 and	 Jonker,	 2014).	 More	 specifically,	 the	 research	 uses	commentary	 from	 some	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 corporate	 governance	 and	 financial	reporting	leaders	(Section	3)	to	highlight	how	the	FRIP	serves	as	a	mechanism	of	accountability	for	companies	listed	on	the	JSE.	In	doing	so,	the	study	provides	a	novel	 institutional	 account	 of	mechanisms	 of	 accountability	 in	 a	 South	 African	setting	 and	 contributes	 to	 the	 need	 for	 theoretical	 and	 methodological	eclecticism	in	South	African	financial	reporting	research	(Brennan	and	Solomon,	2008;	Maroun,	2012a).	Secondly,	it	is	the	first	formal	study	investigating	how	the	review	 processes	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 FRIP	 operate	 as	 sources	 of	 isomorphic	pressure	 to	 ensure	 high	 quality	 financial	 reporting.	 As	 such,	 the	 findings	 are	important	 for	 academics	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 seeking	 to	 understand	 the	
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rationale	for	the	review	functions	carried	out	by	the	FRIP1.	Finally,	the	research	makes	 an	 important	 contribution	 for	 policy-makers.	 It	 provides	 evidence	 in	support	 of	 the	 need	 for	 independent	 review	 functions	 and	 confirms	 the	important	role	played	by	regulation	in	the	capital	market	system.		
1.2	Structure	of	the	thesis	Section	 2	 discusses	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 and	prior	 literature.	 Section	 2.1	discusses	agency	theory	and	different	mechanisms	of	accountability.	Section	2.2	discusses	 the	 primary	 theoretical	 framework,	 institutional	 isomorphism,	 and	explains	the	operation	of	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressures	in	modern	institutional	settings.	These	are	applied	to	the	function	of	the	FRIP	in	Section	2.3.		Section	 3	 explains	 the	 thesis’s	 use	 of	 detailed	 interviews	 with	 experienced	professionals,	 academics	 and	 experts	 to	 obtain	 a	 well-rounded	 and	 balanced	account	 of	 how	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 FRIP	 are	 a	 source	 of	 isomorphic	 pressure.	Section	 3.1	 discusses	 the	 research	 paradigm	 and	 the	 qualitative	 approach.	Section	3.2	 addresses	 the	method	used	 (detailed	 interviews),	why	 this	method	was	selected,	how	the	 interview	agenda	was	 formulated,	and	 the	way	 in	which	validity	 and	 reliability	 were	 ensured	 throughout	 the	 research.	 Section	 3.3	explains	how	the	data	was	selected	and	Section	3.4	elaborates	on	how	the	data	was	analysed.		The	detailed	findings	of	the	research	are	discussed	in	Section	4	and	a	summary	of	 comments	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Section	 5.1.	 Section	 5.2	 provides	 the	 research	contribution	and	Section	5.3	discusses	possible	areas	of	future	research.				
																																																								1	The	 GAAP	 monitoring	 panel	 does	 not	 fall	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research,	despite	being	established	in	2002	and	being	the	predecessor	to	the	FRIP	
 4 
1.3	Research	question	The	primary	research	question:			
Is	the	FRIP	an	example	of	a	mechanism	of	accountability	 in	a	South	African	
financial	reporting	context?		In	order	to	address	this	question,	the	following	three	sub-questions	are	posed:		
1:	 Is	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 a	 source	 of	 coercive	
isochronism	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 companies,	
preparers	of	financial	statements	and	their	auditors?		
2:	 Is	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 a	 source	 of	 normative	
isochronism	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 companies,	
preparers	of	financial	statements	and	their	auditors?		
3.	 Is	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 a	 source	 of	 mimetic	
isochronism	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 companies,	
preparers	of	financial	statements	and	their	auditors?		
1.4	Assumptions	The	study	is	grounded	in	a	social	constructivist	view	of	reality.	Institutions	are,	therefore,	 a	product	of,	 not	 only	 economic	 forces,	 but	 also	powerful	 social	 and	political	 stimuli	 (Creswell,	 2009).	 This	 is	 best	 highlighted	 by	 an	 interpretive	research	style,	in	this	case,	detailed	interviews	(Section	3).					
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1.5	Delimitations	
• The	 research	 neither	 summarises	 nor	 critiques	 IFRS.	 It	 is	 assumes	 that	compliance	 with	 IFRS	 results	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 relevant	 and	 reliable	information	 to	 users	 and	 the	 production	 of	 high	 quality	 financial	statements	(IASB,	2010).	
• The	 study	 does	 not	 examine	 the	 preparation	 of	 integrated	 or	 annual	reports.	In	addition,	as	the	review	processes	of	the	FRIP	are	aimed	only	at	financial	 statements	 (FRIP,	 2011),	 other	 information	 contained	 in	 an	annual	or	integrated	report	is	not	dealt	with.		
• Although	 a	 review	of	 the	 history	 of	 the	 development	 and	 application	 of	IFRS	may	shed	light	on	its	functioning	as	an	instrument	of	legitimisation	(Georgiou	and	Jack,	2011;	Maroun	et	al,	2014)	or	its	disciplinary	potential	(Rodrigues	 and	 Craig,	 2007;	Maroun	 and	 van	 Zijl,	 2015),	 this	 is	 not	 the	focus	of	this	thesis.	
• In	order	 to	 retain	 focus	on	 the	operation	of	 the	FRIP	 in	 a	 South	African	context,	key	differences	between	IFRS	and	other	accounting	standards	or	requirements	are	not	examined.	
• Similarly,	the	activities	of	other	regulatory	bodies	may	be	similar	to	those	of	 the	 FRIP	 and	may	 also	 be	 a	 source	 of	 isomorphic	 pressure.	How,	 for	example,	 the	 Public	 Company	 Accounting	 Oversight	 Board	 (PCAOB)	 or	Financial	 Services	 Board	 (FSB)	 enforce	 accounting	 standards	 in	 their	jurisdictions;	 possible	 sources	 of	 isomorphic	 pressure	 and	 similarities	with	the	FRIP	are	deferred	for	future	research	(Section	5.2).	
• Finally,	 as	 this	 is	 a	 Masters	 report,	 it	 makes	 use	 of	 a	 single	 theoretical	framework.	Other	theories	could	have	been	used	to	explain	the	role	and	function	 of	 the	 FRIP	 such	 as	 legitimacy	 theory,	 theories	 of	 power	 and	control,	 and	 structuration	 theory.	 This	 thesis,	 however,	 concentrates	specifically	on	institutional	isomorphism	given	its	widely	accepted	use	for	explaining	corporate	reporting	in	an	international	context	(Rodrigues	and	Craig,	2007;	Tremblay	and	Gendron,	2011;	Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015).		
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1.6	Definition	This	 proposal	 refers	 to	 ‘FRIP	 reviews’.	 The	 initial	 reviews	 of	 the	 financial	statements	are	carried	out	by	the	academics	at	the	University	of	Johannesburg2.	Findings	 are	 reported	 to	 the	 JSE	 which	 reviews	 the	 information	 and	 refers	selected	cases	to	the	FRIP	for	further	examination.	It	is	also	possible	that	the	JSE	will	 request	 additional	 information	 and	 conclude	 that	 the	 matter	 in	 question	need	not	be	sent	to	the	FRIP	(JSE,	2011b).	The	purpose	of	this	research	is	not	to	identify	 precisely	 which	 aspects	 of	 this	 financial	 review	 process	 give	 rise	 to	different	types	of	isomorphic	pressure.	Instead,	the	research	assumes	that	all	of	the	activities	associated	with	the	review	of	financial	statements	work	collectively	to	drive	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	compliance	with	IFRS.	In	the	interest	of	brevity,	 this	 thesis	 refers	 to	 the	 entire	 review	 process	 as	 ‘FRIP	 reviews’.	 The	research	concentrates	only	on	this	review	process.			It	should	be	noted	that	the	FRIP	is	an	advisory	body	to	the	JSE	and	does	not	enjoy	direct	statutory	power	(FRIP,	2011).	As	a	result,	FRIP	reviews	are	not	a	source	of	coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	 in	 themselves.	 Nevertheless	 as	 explained	 in	Section	4	 the	effect	of	FRIP	reviews	on	preparers	and	auditors	can	give	rise	 to	different	sources	of	isomorphic	pressure.						 	
																																																								2 	Exploring	 the	 technical	 rigour	 of	 the	 analysis	 being	 performed	 by	 this	institution	is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	
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2.	Literature	review	This	literature	review	is	structured	as	follows:	Table	1:	Literature	review	structure		
	
2.1	Theoretical	framework	
2.1.1	Agency	and	stakeholder	theory	Agency	theory	predicts	that	the	separation	of	management	and	owner	functions	results	 in	 a	 loss	 of	 economic	 value	 (Jensen	 and	Meckling,	 1976).	Agents,	 being	rational	 utility	 maximisers,	 do	 not	 necessarily	 behave	 as	 intended	 by	 their	principals,	requiring	a	system	of	checks	and	balances	to	mitigate	residual	losses	(Solomon,	 2010).	 Examples	 include	 incentives,	 monitoring	 systems,	 and	additional	disclosure	designed	to	reduce	information	asymmetry	between	agents	and	principals	(Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976).		
2	Literature	review	
2.1	Theoretical	framework	
2.1.1	Mechanisms	of	accountability	
2.1.2	On	the	mechanisms	of	accountability	
2.2	Isomorphaism	
2.2.1	Coercive	isomorphism	
2.2.2	Normative	isomorphism	
2.2.3	Mimetic	isomorphism	
2.3	Compliance,	isomorphism	and	the	FRIP	
2.3.1	The	FRIP	
2.3.2	The	FRIP	as	a	source	of	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressure	
 8 
	Stakeholder	 theory	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 progression	 of	 agency	 theory.	 A	 key	difference	 is	 that,	 where	 agency	 theory	 emphasises	 the	 relationship	 between	owners	 and	 managers,	 stakeholder	 theory	 adopts	 a	 broader	 perspective	(Brennan	and	Solomon,	2008).	An	organisation	is	no	longer	accountable	only	for	the	returns	generated	for	shareholders	but	also	to	a	wider	group	of	stakeholders	in	 terms	 of	 both	 its	 financial	 and	 non-financial	 performance	 (IOD,	 2009;	Solomon,	 2010;	 IRCSA,	 2011).	 As	 such,	 the	 use	 of	 non-executive	 directors,	committees	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 internal	 and	 external	 auditors,	 financial	reporting	 standards,	 and	 guidelines	 for	 the	 disclosure	 of	 non-financial	information	at	the	hearts	of	most	codes	of	corporate	governance	can	be	thought	of	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 system	 of	 checks	 and	 balances	 (La	 Porta	 et	 al,	 2000;	Brennan	 and	 Solomon,	 2008).	 Each	 is	 an	 example	 of	 how	 recommended	 best	practice	 or	 statutory	 requirements	 are	 used	 as	 mechanisms	 of	 accountability	designed	 to	 manage	 divergent	 interests	 of	 an	 ever	 more	 complex	 group	 of	stakeholders.			The	 financial	 reporting	 process	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 the	 process	 of	managing	 principal/agent	 relationships.	 In	 addition	 to	 providing	 financial	information	 to	 assist	 providers	 of	 capital	 with	 their	 investment	 and	 lending	decisions	 (IASB,	 2010),	 financial	 statements	 are	 an	 important	 element	 in	 the	mechanisms	 used	 to	 hold	 stewards	 accountable	 for	 the	 management	 of	 the	financial	 resources	 under	 their	 control	 (Whittington,	 2008;	 Ravenscroft	 and	Williams,	2009).		
2.1.2	On	the	mechanisms	of	accountability	Due	to	the	nature	of	the	word	and	the	multidisciplinary	fields	which	it	needs	to	address,	there	can	be	no	single	definition	of	‘accountability’	(Ebrahim,	2003).	For	the	 purpose	 of	 this	 research	 ‘accountability’	 refers	 to	 ‘…	 the	 means	 by	 which	individuals	 and	 organisations	 report	 to	 a	 recognized	 authority	 (or	 authorities)	and	are	held	responsible	for	their	actions…’	(Edwards	and	Hulme,	1996,	p.	976).			
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As	 per	 this	 definition,	 accountability	 comprises	 two	 interconnected	 functions.	The	first	is	the	responsibility	of	the	individual	to	report	his	actions,	and	the	next	is	 to	be	held	 responsible	 for	 those	actions	 (Alrazi	et	al,	2015).	This	 transforms	the	person	from	an	individual	to	the	object	of	accountability	in	order	to	promote	normalising	 change	 (Roberts,	 2009).	 For	 this	 to	be	 effective	 it	 is	 important	 for	the	 mechanisms	 of	 accountability	 to	 be	 accepted	 as	 a	 legitimate	 means	 of	assessing	 and	 correcting	 performance	 (Grant	 and	Keohane,	 2005;	Maroun	 and	Atkins,	2014)	and	for	the	authority	of	the	parties	to	the	relationship	to	promote	normalising	 change	 (Foucault,	 1977;	 Grant	 and	 Keohane,	 2005).	 The	 prior	literature	offers	most	accounting	technologies	as	examples	of	the	functioning	of	this	type	of	system	of	accountability.	
	
Accounting	as	a	mechanism	of	accountability	According	to	Hopwood	(1987),	accountancy	is	more	than	a	neutral	 information	processing	 system.	 It	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 construct	 fields	 of	 economic	 visibility	which	 can	 be	mobilised	 to	 hold	 individuals	 accountable.	 For	 example,	 Hopper	and	 Macintosh	 (1993)	 and	 Cowton	 and	 Dopson	 (2002)	 explain	 how	 standard	costing	and	budgeting	are	used	as	instruments	of	governmentality.	These	offer	a	rational	 and	 credible	 means	 for	 quantifying	 financial	 performance	 and	contrasting	 this	 with	 predetermined	 standards.	 Together	 with	 a	 credible	reporting	hierarchy,	these	otherwise	technical	accounting	instruments	are	used	to	 render	 individuals	 visible	 and	 subject	 them	 to	 corrective	 action.	Miller	 and	O'Leary	(1987)	provide	a	similar	account	where	“accounting	by	the	numbers”	is	used	 to	 rank	 the	 performance	 of	 individuals,	 identify	 abnormalities	 in	 the	production	process	and	achieve	a	sense	of	disciplinary	control	by	relying	on	the	accounting	system	as	a	process	of	examination.			Mennicken	and	Miller	(2012)	confirm	these	findings.	They	argue	that	accounting	systems	can	be	used	to	“distil”	corporate	performance	into	financial	information	in	order	 to	 facilitate	comparability	and	 intervention	by	senior	management.	To	do	this,	accounting	draws	on	its	disciplinary	potential	(Hopwood,	1987)	as	well	as	 its	 generally	 accepted	 basis	 for	 describing	 economic	 reality	 (Rodrigues	 and	Craig,	 2007).	 In	 other	 words,	 accounting	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	
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accountability	because	 it	 enables	normalising	examination	and	change.	Equally	important	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 accounting	 system	 has,	 over	 time,	 come	 to	 be	accepted	as	the	primary	means	of	describing	economic	activity	so	that	the	norms	and	standards	used	to	drive	change	are	readily	accepted	as	legitimate	(Hopwood,	1987;	 Gray	 et	 al,	 1996;	 Roberts,	 2009;	 Mennicken	 and	 Miller,	 2012).	 This	theoretical	framework	can	be	applied	to	the	corporate	reporting	process	where	the	 company,	 in	 additional	 to	 the	 individual	 preparers	 of	 financial	 statements,	becomes	the	subject	of	technologies	of	accountability.	
	
Financial	statements	as	a	mechanism	of	accountability	Financial	statements	are	an	important	tool	for	those	charged	with	governance	to	communicate	 a	 firm’s	 financial	 performance	 to	 its	 stakeholders	 (Healy	 and	Palepu,	 2001).	 The	 accounting	 information	produced	by	organisation	has	been	“…institutionalised	 as	 the	 most	 important,	 authoritative	 and	 telling	 means	whereby	activity	is	made	visible…”	(Roberts,	1991,	p.	359).			In	this	light,	the	IASB	describes	the	primary	objective	of	financial	statements	as	providing	useful	information	to	investors	and	lenders	to	enable	them	to	make	a	decision	 on	 the	 advancement	 of	 funds	 to	 potential	 investees	 and	 borrowers	(IASB,	2010).	The	financial	statements	are,	however,	also	important	for	holding	stewards	 accountable	 for	 the	 financial	 resources	 under	 their	 control	(Ravenscroft	 and	Williams,	 2009).	 For	 example,	 the	 development	 of	 fair	 value	accounting	 provides	 a	 means	 of	 comparing	 the	 returns	 generated	 by	 an	organisation	with	 the	 fair	 value	 of	 the	 respective	 assets	 in	 order	 to	 gauge	 the	efficient	utilisation	of	capital	resources	(Maroun	and	Garnett,	2014).			Similarly,	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 comparability	 of	 the	 financial	 statements	 by	the	IASB	(2010)	is	intended	to	allow	investors	to	contrast	the	financial	position	and	performance	of	organisations	and	allow	the	efficient	allocation	of	capital.	In	addition,	many	 codes	of	 corporate	governance	and	 company	 law	 recognise	 the	importance	 of	 financial	 statements	 for	 providing	 a	 broad	 review	 of	 how	 well	managers	 have	 deployed	 the	 capital	 resources	 entrusted	 to	 them	 by	 investors	and	creditors	(Companies	Act,	2008;	IOD,	2009).	For	this	reason,	the	importance	
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of	 accounting	 information	 in	 the	 sound	 functioning	 of	 capital	 markets	 is	evidenced	by	equity	price	reactions	 to	 the	release	of	new	financial	 information	(Healy	and	Palepu,	2001).		The	 financial	 reporting	 standards	 underlying	 statements	 of	 financial	 position,	performance	and	cash	flows	are	not	only	used	to	describe	the	technical	features	of	 the	 accounting	 craft	 (Maroun	 and	 van	 Zijl,	 2015).	 Over	 time	 they	 have	developed	 into	 the	 very	 discourse	 used	 to	 describe	 what	 constitutes	 useful	information	and	have	become	the	benchmark	against	which	financial	statements	are	evaluated	(Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015).	Similar	to	the	role	of	budgeting	and	standard	 costing	 described	 previously	 (Hopper	 and	 Macintosh,	 1993;	 Cowton	and	Dopson,	2002),	 formal	accounting	standards	provide	the	basis	or	norm	for	evaluating	 the	 financial	 position	 and	 performance	 of	 the	 reporting	 entity.	 In	doing	so,	they	offer	a	framework	for	evaluating	these	economic	dimensions	and	holding	those	charged	with	the	organisation’s	governance	accountable.			As	explained	by	Roberts	(1991,	p.	359),	the	preparation	of	 financial	statements	allows	 the	 company	 to	 ‘…	 present	 a	 seemingly	 unavoidable	 incontrovertible	image	of	 [itself]	 and	 [its]	 activities’.	The	 creation	of	 this	 ‘self-image’	 allows	 the	company	 to	 ‘view’	 itself	 and	 understand	 how	 its	 stakeholders	 view	 it.	 This,	 in	turn,	drives	 the	company	 to	maintain	or	modify	 its	 reporting	 (and	possibly,	 its	underlying	behaviour)	to	achieve	a	predetermined	‘conceptualisation	of	the	self’	and	either	secure	or	attain	a	sense	of	organisational	legitimacy	(Roberts,	1991).	This	point	should	not	be	overlooked	because,	as	explained	by	Grant	and	Keohane	(2005),	 for	 the	mechanism	 of	 accountability	 to	 function	 effectively,	 a	 sense	 of	legitimacy	 is	 required.	 In	 other	 words,	 for	 technologies	 of	 accountability	 to	promote	 conformance	 or	 change,	 they	 themselves	 must	 be	 accepted	 as	legitimate.			In	this	context,	generally	accepted	accounting	practice	has	been	codified	by	the	IASB	with	 the	 result	 that	 IFRS	have	become	a	 repository	of	 technical	expertise	and	 knowledge	 (Ravenscroft	 and	Williams,	 2009)	 and	 an	 important	 source	 of	pragmatic	 and	 cognitive	 legitimacy	 (Maroun	 and	 van	 Zijl,	 2015).	 The	
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proliferation	of	IFRS	in	multiple	jurisdictions	has	added	to	its	accepted	status	as	a	 legitimate	 basis	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 general	 purpose	 financial	 statements	(Rodrigues	 and	 Craig,	 2007).	 Consequently,	 compliance	with	 IFRS	 becomes	 an	important	 means	 of	 demonstrating	 how	 an	 organisation	 has	 adopted	 best	reporting	practice	in	the	interests	of	its	stakeholders	and,	become,	an	important	source	of	organisational	 legitimacy	(Rodrigues	and	Craig,	2007).	This	results	 in	the	 acceptance	 of	 IFRS	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 describing	 the	 financial	 position	 and	performance	 of	 the	 reporting	 entity.	 In	 other	 words,	 accountability	 and	legitimacy	are	inextricably	linked.	As	explained	previously,	the	formal	structure	of	 the	 accounting	 system,	 coupled	 with	 its	 potential	 to	 construct	 fields	 of	economic	 visibility,	means	 that	 the	 accounting	 system	 acts	 as	 a	mechanism	 of	accountability.	This	 is,	however,	only	possible	because	 the	accounting	craft	has	become	a	readily	accepted	part	of	the	capital	market	paradigm.	Its	pragmatic	and	cognitive	 legitimacy	 give	 rise	 to	 normative,	mimetic	 and	 coercive	 pressures	 to	comply	with	 the	 accounting	 standards.	To	explore	 this	 line	of	 thought	 in	more	detail,	Section	2.2	explains	the	operation	of	these	isomorphic	forces.			
2.2	Isomorphism		“Isomorphism”	 is	 a	 term	 commonly	 used	 in	 Natural	 Science	 to	 explain	 how	organisms	become	the	same	over	time3.	The	tern	is	also	applied	in	sociology	to	describe	a	process	by	which	organisations	converge	as	a	result	of	social,	political	and	economic	forces	(Rodrigues	and	Craig,	2007).	In	this	way	isomorphism	is	a	key	 part	 of	 institutional	 theory	 as	 it	 can	 be	 used	 to	 explain	 how	organisations	adapt	 their	 structures	 and	 management	 practices	 in	 order	 to	 mirror	 what	 is	already	 accepted	 as	 legitimate	 and	 ensure	 a	 continued	 survival	 (Meyer	 and	Rowan,	 1977;	 Suchman,	 1995).	 DiMaggio	 and	 Powell	 (1983)	 go	 on	 to	 identify	normative,	mimetic	and	coercive	variants	of	isomorphic	pressure.			
																																																								3	As	per	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	(2015)	
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2.2.1	Coercive	isomorphism	Coercive	 isomorphism	 is	 isomorphic	 change	 caused	 by	 external	 forces	 exerted	on	the	organisation	by	a	party	in	a	position	of	relative	power	and	authority,	and	is	the	result	of	both	formal	and	informal	pressures	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983;	Fogarty,	 1992),	 .	 The	 clearest	 example	 of	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	 is	 the	need	to	comply	with	prevailing	laws	and	regulations	in	order	to	avoid	sanctions	(see	Meyer	and	Rowan,	1977;	Suchman,	1995).			
Examples	of	coercive	isomorphism	Companies	 incur	 significant	 financial	 costs	 to	 identify	 applicable	 laws	 and	regulations	and	introduce	the	necessary	systems	to	ensure	that	they	comply	with	the	 relevant	 prescriptions	 and	 discharge	 their	 compliance	 and	 prescriptive	reporting	duties	 (KPMG,	2013).	 Compliance	with	 these	 laws	 and	 regulations	 is	also	 an	 important	mechanism	 through	which	 the	organisation	 gains	 a	 sense	of	moral	legitimacy	(Roberts,	1991).	Moral	legitimacy	is	gained	by	the	organisation	when	 it	 complies	 with	 the	 prevailing	 rules	 of	 the	 environment	 in	 which	 it	operates	(Foldvary,	2011).		For	 example,	 KPMG	 (2013)	 found	 that	 the	 new	 regulatory	 and	 reporting	environment	has	resulted	in	a	significant	increase	in	compliance	costs,	which,	in	the	hedge	fund	industry,	as	an	example,	are	estimated	at	more	than	$3	Billion	,	or	about	 seven	 percent	 of	 total	 operating	 costs.	 In	 a	 similar	 study,	 PwC	 (2014)	found	 that	 almost	 half	 of	 the	 respondents	 reported	 an	 increase	 in	 compliance	staffing	 levels.	 They	 believe	 this	 is	 an	 indication	 that	 “…	 business	 is	 becoming	more	 complex,”	 which	 is,	 in	 turn,	 “…	 driving	 increased	 regulatory	requirements…”	(PwC,	2014,	p.	15).		Coercive	 isomorphism	 is	 not	 only	 the	 result	 of	 explicitly	 defined	 laws	 and	regulations	 but	 can	 also	 result	 from	 the	 prevailing	 socio-political	 context	 in	which	 the	 organisations	 operate.	 In	 institutional	 environments,	 companies	 are	always	 under	 pressure	 to	 appear	 responsive	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 stakeholders,	morally	 responsible	 and	 cognisant	 of	 social	 expectations	 in	 order	 ensure	legitimacy	 and,	 in	 turn,	 their	 continued	 existence	 (Meyer	 and	 Rowan,	 1977;	
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Suchman,	 1995;	Atkins	 et	 al,	 2015).	 For	 example,	much	 of	 the	 development	 in	non-financial	reporting	over	the	last	20	years	has	been	attributed	to	the	need	to	secure	legitimacy,	rather	than	as	a	result	of	the	functioning	of	specific	laws	and	regulations	 (de	 Villiers	 and	 van	 Staden,	 2006).	 The	 same	 is	 true	 in	 a	 South	African	 context	 where,	 more	 broadly,	 companies	 dedicate	 considerable	resources	 to	 ensuring	 compliance	 with	 recommended	 corporate	 governance	principles	(Carels	et	al,	2013;	Loate	et	al,	2015;	Raemaekers	et	al,	2015)	.	Codes	of	best	practice,	 such	as	King-III	 and	 the	Global	Reporting	Guidelines	 (GRI),	do	not	 enjoy	 the	 direct	 force	 of	 law	 and	 yet	 many	 local	 companies	 continue	 to	allocate	extensive	resources	to	ensure	minimum	levels	of	compliance	in	line	with	stakeholders’	 expectations	 (KPMG,	 2013).	 The	 desire	 to	 comply	 with	 codes	 of	best	 practice,	 such	 as	 King-III,	 is	 an	 example	 of	 how	 organisations	 attempt	 to	gain	consequential	legitimacy	through	conformity	with	universal	principles	(see	Roberts,	1991)4.			The	relevance	of	the	JSE’s	listing	requirements	should	not	be	overlooked.	These	do	 not	 mandate	 directly	 compliance	 with	 King-III	 but	 introduce	 a	 comply-or-explain	model	 in	 terms	 of	which	 companies	 are	 recommended	 to	 comply	with	codes	 of	 corporate	 governance	 or	 provide	 their	 reasons	 for	 not	 doing	 so	 (JSE,	2013).	Again	the	listing	requirements	do	not	have	the	same	authority	as	Statute	but	the	need	to	conform	with	the	JSE’s	expectations	becomes	a	powerful	source	of	coercive	isomorphic	pressure	(Maroun	et	al,	2014;	Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015).			Compliance	with	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	is	another	example	of	explicit	and	implicit	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.	On	one	level	company	law	(Companies	Act,	2008)	and	the	 JSE	(2013)	require	 listed	companies	 to	prepare	financial	 statements	 in	 compliance	 with	 IFRS.	 However,	 as	 explained	 by	Rodrigues	and	Craig	(2007),	 the	 technical	rigour	of	 these	accounting	standards	and	 institutionalisation	 of	 the	 standard	 setting	 process	 allow	 compliance	with	IFRS	to	be	an	important	source	of	procedural	legitimacy.	Once	again	the	result	is																																																									4	The	 importance	 of	 the	 codification	 of	 best	 reporting	 practice	 for	 achieving	 a	sense	of	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressure	cannot	be	overlooked	and	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Section	4	
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that	 the	 need	 to	 meet	 societal	 expectations,	 resulting	 in	 coercive	 isomorphic	pressures,	is	an	important	part	in	explaining	the	proliferation	of	IFRS	across	the	globe.			One	 may	 argue,	 more	 broadly,	 that	 the	 day-to-day	 functioning	 of	 accounting	systems	 are,	 in	 themselves,	 also	 an	 instrument	 of	 coercive	 isomorphism.	 As	explained	by	DiMaggio	and	Powell	(1983,	p.	150)	
…legal	 and	 technical	 requirements	 of	 the	 State	 –	 the	
vicissitudes	of	the	budget	cycle,	the	ubiquity	of	certain	fiscal	
years,	annual	reports,	and	financial	reporting	requirements	
that	ensure	eligibility	 for	the	receipt	of	 federal	contracts	of	
funds	…		have	 a	 profound	 effect	 on	 the	 structure	 and	 functioning	 of	 the	 respective	organisation	and	induce	compliance.	In	this	way,	coercive	isomorphic	pressure	is	the	result	of	externally	applied	force,	influencing	the	organisation	to	be	compliant	with	 prevailing	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 codes	 of	 best	 practice	 and	 societal	expectations.	The	codification	of	 these	reporting	guidelines	can,	however,	result	in	 the	 concurrent	 functioning	 of	 both	 coercive	 and	 normative	 isomorphic	pressure.	 In	 some	 instances,	 the	 fact	 that	 reporting	 requirements	 are	 generally	regarded	as	best	practice	can	give	rise	to	significant	pressure	to	comply	even	in	cases	 where	 compliance	 cannot	 be	 enforced	 directly	 by	 law	 or	 other	 coercive	means.	This	is	examined	in	more	detail	in	Section	2.2.2		
2.2.2	Normative	isomorphism	Another	 powerful	 source	 of	 isomorphism	 is	 the	 convergence	 in	 relative	behaviour	derived	from	the	effects	of	professionalization	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983).			‘Professionalisation’,	 as	a	 concept,	has	 resulted	 in	 society	granting	professional	bodies	(and	their	members):	
…	 (a)	monopoly	 status	 (laws	 prohibit	 non-members	 of	 the	
profession	 from	 practising);	 (b)	 authority	 to	 decide	 both	
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who	 enters	 the	 required	 training	 and	 how	 that	 training	 is	
organised,	 conducted	 and	 evaluated,	 and	 (c)	 participation	
with	governmental	agencies	in	monitoring	practice.	(Hilton	
and	Slotnick,	2005).				Through	this	process	a	fiduciary	relationship	has	been	inaugurated,	resulting	in	the	 establishment	 of	 a	 profession	 that	 is	 self-aware	 of	 its	 responsibility	 to	society,	 responds	 to	 the	 profession’s	 ideals,	 and	 has	 the	 accountability	 of	 its	members	as	a	primary	objective	(Fogarty,	1992;	Hilton	and	Slotnick,	2005).			
Examples	of	normative	isomorphism		The	power	of	professionalisation	 in	a	normative	 isomorphic	 context	 is	derived	from	the	notion	that	the	preparers	of	financial	statements	generally	hold	similar	interchangeable	 positions	 across	 organisations	 (DiMaggio	 and	 Powell,	 1983).	This	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 individuals	 having	 undergone	 similar	 strict	 and	 closely	monitored	tertiary	and	professional	education,	and	the	establishment	of	strong	professional	networks	between	associates	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983;	Fogarty,	1992).	Through	this	process,	these	professionals	have	surrendered	an	element	of	individuality	and	instead	operate	in	a	manner	in	which	they	are	able	to	discharge	their	 professional	 duties	 effectively.	 In	 addition,	 the	 labour	 market	 in	 which	these	 individuals	 operate	 is	 “skewed	 firmly	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 employing	organisation”	(Roberts,	1991,	p.	358).	These	individuals	are	ranked	according	to	how	the	employer	has	assessed	them,	against	what	society	defines	as	competent,	and	ensuring	compliance	with	this,	makes	the	 individual	a	viable	competitor	 in	the	market	(Roberts,	1991;	Suchman,	1995).		An	important	influence	of	normative	isomorphic	pressure	is	the	need	to	be	seen	as	 compliant	with	 the	 standards	 of	 best	 practice	 prescribed	 by	 the	 profession	(DiMaggio	 and	 Powell,	 1983).	 The	 cognitive	 legitimacy	 which	 these	 standards	enjoy	means	that	adherence	to	their	prescriptions	is	the	most	effective	means	of	conferring	creditability	on	the	individual	preparer	(Fogarty,	1992)	.	For	example,	‘misconduct’	 is	 not	 defined	 conceptually	 in	 terms	 of	 generally	 accepted	
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theoretical	 frameworks	 but	 rather	 in	 terms	 of	 deviations	 from	 the	 codes	 of	professional	 conduct	 issued	by	 the	profession.	 Similarly	high	quality	 corporate	reports	 are	 not	 measured	 according	 to	 their	 perceived	 usefulness	 to	 the	respective	stakeholder	groups	but	according	to	the	extent	to	which	they	comply	with	the	interpretations	of	what	constitutes	“useful”	information	by	professional	accounting	bodies	(see	Malsch	and	Gendron,	2011).	For	example,	the	EY	(2013)	report	on	best	corporate	reporter	makes	no	effort	to	engage	with	stakeholders	in	order	 to	determine	which	 companies	are	providing	users	with	 the	most	useful	information.	Instead	the	disclosures	recommended	by	the	GRI	and	the	IIRC	have	attained	 a	 state	 of	 cognitive	 legitimacy	 and	 are	 automatically	 accepted	 as	 the	benchmark	for	high	quality	corporate	reports.	Consequently,	the	codification	of	non-financial	reporting	guidelines	and	recommended	best	corporate	governance	practice	gives	rise	to	significant	isomorphic	pressure	to	comply	with	the	likes	of	GRI,	King-III	and	IIRC.	As	discussed	in	Section	2.2.1,	there	are	possible	sources	of	coercive	 isomorphic	 driving	 compliance.	 Contemporaneously,	 as	 important	sources	of	procedural	and	structural	legitimacy,	these	codes	of	best	practice	are	endorsed	 by	 different	 professional	 accounting	 bodies	 as	 the	 primary	 basis	 for	describing	 what	 “good”	 corporate	 reports	 ought	 to	 look	 like	 and	 what	 their	individual	 members	 should	 be	 adhering	 to.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 guidance	provided	 by	 the	 GRI,	 King-III	 and	 the	 IIRC	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 combination	 of	normative	and	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.		The	same	applies	from	a	financial	reporting	perspective.	In	some	instances,	laws	and	regulations	prohibit	non-compliance	with	financial	reporting	standards	and	are	 a	 source	 of	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	 (see	 Section	 2.2.1).	 At	 the	 same	time,	 professionals	 appointed	 by	 the	 organisation	 to	 manage	 the	 financial	reporting	process	become	the	custodians	of	their	institution’s	financial	reporting	duties	(see	Fogarty,	1992).	Their	failure	to	discharge	these	duties	adequately	not	only	 has	 an	 unfavourable	 effect	 on	 the	 institution	 but	 also	 on	 the	 responsible	individual	 who	 is	 identified	 by	 important	 stakeholders,	 including	 the	 relevant	
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professional	bodies,	as	operating	contrary	to	recommended	practice	and	without	sufficient	care	and	skill5.			The	 reason	 these	 professional	 accounting	 bodies	 are	 able	 to	 exert	 this	 kind	 of	isomorphic	pressure	on	individuals	is	that	they	themselves	are	considered	to	be	legitimate	bodies	(Fogarty,	1992).	These	bodies	are	able	to	dictate	or	prescribe	what	 are	 the	 socially	 accepted	 correct	 behaviours	 due	 to	 their	 long	establishment,	 high	 societal	 standing,	 extensive	 technical	 skills	 base,	 and	leadings	minds	in	both	its	member	and	steering	base.	Through	the	combination	of	 these	 influences,	 the	 professional	 accounting	 bodies	 themselves	 are	considered	to	be	legitimate	and	this	allow	them	to	dictate	what	is	best	practice	(Roberts,	 1991).	 By	 adhering	 to	 this	 prescribed	 best	 practice,	 the	 individual	 is	able	 both	 to	 ensure	 continued	 existence	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 leverage	 its	adherence	to	gain	legitimacy	in	its	operating	environment.		As	 these	 professionals	 operate	 in	 this	 highly	 educated,	 regulated	 and	interchangeable	environment,	 there	 is	 a	great	deal	of	pressure	 to	ensure	 these	individuals	 maintain	 the	 sense	 of	 moral	 legitimacy	 granted	 to	 them	 by	 the	profession	 (Fogarty,	 1992).	Maintaining	 this	moral	 legitimacy	 is	 of	 the	 utmost	importance	to	the	professional	due	to	the	cross-hiring	of	these	individuals	from	firms	within	the	same	industry	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983).			Due	to	the	pressure	placed	on	the	preparers	and	the	interchangeability	of	their	roles	 within	 organisations,	 they	 seek	 to	 avoid	 stigmatisation	 attached	 to	incorrectly	compiled	financial	statements.	In	an	effort	to	maintain	the	legitimacy	granted,	they	seek	to	prepare	the	highest	quality	financial	statements	possible	in	the	 current	 circumstances	 (Fogarty,	 1992)	 .	 This	 ensures	 the	professionals	 are	associated	with	high	quality	standards,	ensuring	their	own	legitimacy	and	future	within	the	profession	and	the	organisation	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983).	Fogarty	(1992)	highlights	the	importance	of	this:																																																									5	The	professional	 is,	 in	 effect,	 associated	with	a	 report	 that	does	not	meet	 the	standard	set	by	the	professional	bodies.	As	this	is	in	direct	contravention	of	what	the	society	expects,	the	legitimacy	of	the	individual	is	then	called	into	question	
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Individuals’	 awareness	 of	 their	 personal	 economic	 viability	
is	 likely	 to	 be	 an	 omnipresent	 background	 feature	 in	 the	
direction	and	magnitude	of	purposeful	personal	change.		
2.2.3	Mimetic	isomorphism		The	 final	source	of	 institutional	 isomorphism	 is	mimetic	 isomorphism.	Mimetic	isomorphism	 is	 the	process	whereby	organisations	mimic	or	gravitate	 towards	others	as	a	response	to	uncertainties	in	their	operating	environment	(Meyer	and	Rowan,	1977;	DiMaggio	and	Powell,	 1983).	Due	 to	organisations	 facing	 similar	uncertainties,	 those	 who	 are	 perceived	 to	 address	 these	 uncertainties	 are	mimicked	 by	 others	 who	 seek	 leverage	 from	 this	 perceived	 legitimacy.	 This	uncertainty	 effectively	 ‘…	 compels	organizations	 to	 seek	 structuration	patterns	and	actions	from	other	organizations.’	(Freitas	and	Guimarães,	2007,	p.	39).			
Examples	of	mimetic	isomorphism	King-III	 is	 an	 example	 of	 mimetic	 isomorphism	 as	 it	 requires	 a	 company	 to	prepare	 an	 integrated	 report	 or	 explain	 why	 such	 a	 report	 has	 not	 been	prepared.	Those	charged	with	preparing	these	integrated	reports	in	2010	were	“challenged	by	limited	and	evolving	draft	guidance”	no	limited	examples	of	what	these	 reports	 ought	 to	 represent	 (EY,	 2013,	 p.	 25).	 Furthermore,	 the	 guidance	offered	by	the	IIRC	is	principles	–	based	and	not	specific	to	any	one	industry	or	business	 model.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 tendency	 for	 preparers	 to	 refer	 to	 other	prescriptions,	 such	 as	 those	 offered	 by	 the	 GRI,	 to	 inform	 the	 inclusion	 of	information	 in	 their	 integrated	 reports	 (Maroun	 et	 al,	 2014)	 These	 reporting	guidelines	 are	 technical	 reports	 prepared	 by	 competent	 authorities	 after	extensive	consultation	with	the	relevant	stakeholders.	Consequently,	they	are	an	important	 source	 of	 pragmatic	 and	 procedural	 legitimacy.	 As	 discussed	 in	Section	2.2.1	and	2.2.2,	the	guidelines	are	also	represent	a	reporting	requirement	(coercive	 isomorphism)	 to	 use	 a	 professionally	 developed	 set	 of	 principles	(normative	isomorphism)	to	achieve	an	application	of	disclosures	comparable	to	
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the	 reporting	 entity’s	 peers6.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 uncertain	reporting	environment,	preparers	 replicate	disclosure	 requirements,	which	are	already	 accepted	 as	 legitimate	 (and	 exert	 coercive	 and	 normative	 isomorphic	pressure)	 to	 ensure	 the	 credibility	 of	 their	 integrated	 reports.	 To	 paraphrase	DiMaggio	and	Powell	(1983),	the	result	is	the	mimetic	proliferation	of	integrated	reports	with	similar	content	and	structure	(for	example,	see	Atkins	and	Maroun,	2015;	Loate	et	al,	2015).			From	an	integrated	reporting	perspective,	a	source	of	mimetic	isomorphism	can	be	 found	 in	 the	 “	 EY	 -	 Excellence	 in	 Integrated	Reporting	Awards”	 (EY,	 2013).	This	 publication	 surveys	 the	 integrated	 reports	 prepared	 by	 the	 100	 top	 JSE-listed	 companies7 	and	 the	 top	 10	 State-owned	 companies.	 The	 companies’	integrated	reports	are	reviewed	and	benchmarked	against	the	results	of	the	EY	Excellence	 in	 integrated	 reporting	 survey,	 and	 a	 model	 integrated	 report	prepared	 using	 the	 guidance	 from	 local	 and	 international	 integrated	 reporting	bodies.	The	 results	 of	 these	 awards	 are	 then	published,	 ranking	 the	 integrated	reports	of	 these	companies,	by	name,	 in	 five	categories	namely	“progress	 to	be	made”,	average,	good,	excellent,	and	Top	10.	This	has	provided	preparers	with	a	list	of	integrated	reports	to	which	they	can	turn	to	as	illustrative	examples	across	a	 large	 sector	base	when	preparing	 their	own	organisation’s	 integrated	 report.	The	publication	of	the	reporting	survey	by	a	group	of	experts	clarifying	expected	best	 practice	 is	 itself	 a	 source	 of	 normative	 and	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	(see	Section	2.2.1	and	2.2.2).	 In	addition,	by	organisations	looking	to	the	highly	coveted	 integrated	 reports	 and	 mimicking	 the	 form	 and	 disclosure	 of	 these	reports,	 their	 own	 integrated	 reports	 start	 to	 resemble	 the	 reports	 society	believes	are	best	and,	as	 such,	 converging	of	a	handful	of	examples	 in	order	 to	overcome	 the	 uncertainty	 which	 the	 requirements	 of	 preparing	 an	 integrated	report	creates	(mimetic	isomorphic	pressure).			
																																																								6	The	researcher	would	like	to	thank	one	of	the	anonymous	reviewers	for	highlighting	this	point	7	Based	on	market	capitalisation	
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The	 inverse	 of	 mimetic	 isomorphism	 can	 also	 have	 a	 strong	 influence.	 An	example	 of	 this,	 in	 terms	 of	 integrated	 reporting,	 is	 the	 publication	 of	 the	“progress	to	be	made”	list	in	the	EY	Report	(EY,	2013).	This	provides	prepareres	with	a	list	of	integrated	reports	which,	when	judged	against	the	benchmark,	have	been	 found	 lacking	 and	 should	 be	 avoided.	 This	 process,	 instead	 of	 creating	something	 that	 can	 be	 copied,	 creates	 a	 list	 of	 companies	 to	 be	 avoided	 and	pushes	 the	 environment	 away	 from	 disclosure,	 which	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	inappropriate.		
2.3	Compliance,	isomorphism	and	the	FRIP	
2.3.1	The	FRIP	Of	particular	interest	for	the	purpose	of	this	research	is	that	repeated	corporate	scandals	 and	 the	 on-going	 financial	 crisis	 have	 highlighted	 the	 need	 for	independent	monitoring	bodies	 (Brown	and	Tarca,	2005;	Malsch	and	Gendron,	2011).	These	bodies	should	have	sufficient	power	to	enable	effective	monitoring	and	 enforcement	 to	 drive	 higher	 levels	 of	 reporting	 quality	 and	 corporate	accountability	 (Brown	 and	 Tarca,	 2005).	 For	 example,	 the	 Financial	 Reporting	Council	 (FRC)8	in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (U.K.)	 is	 responsible	 for	 independent	monitoring	of	financial	statement	quality.	The	review	mechanism	is	proactive	in	nature,	with	the	FRC	also	responding	to	matters	brought	to	its	attention	(Hines	et	al,	2001).	The	FRC	carries	out	reviews	with	the	aim	of	ensuring	that	financial	information	provided	by	public	companies	(and	some	large	private	companies)	complies	with	 relevant	 financial	 reporting	 requirements.	This	 includes	 reviews	of	directors’	reports	and	company	accounts	for	compliance	with	applicable	laws	and	regulations	(FRC,	2016).			Similarly,	 in	 the	United	 States	 of	America	 (U.S.A.),	 the	 Securities	 and	Exchange	Commission	 (SEC)	 aims	 to	 ensure	 that	 ‘…	 investors	 are	 furnished	 with	 the	
																																																								8	Previously	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 FRC	 known	 as	 the	 Financial	 Reporting	Review	Panel	(FRRP)	
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information	necessary	for	informed	investment	decisions9’	(Hines	et	al,	2001,	p.	3).	For	example,	the	Division	of	Corporation	Finance	assists	the	SEC	by	reviewing	material	 information	 being	 provided	 to	 investors.	 Companies	 are	 required	 to	comply	 with	 regulations	 dealing	 with	 prescribed	 disclosures	 when	 shares	 are	sold	 and	 on	 a	 continuing	 and	 periodic	 basis	 (SEC,	 2016).	 The	 SEC	 is	 able	 to	enforce	minimum	reporting	 requirements	 through	 the	 rejection	of	 the	 filing	of	the	company’s	financial	results,	preventing	the	company	from	obtaining	a	listing	or	 alternately	 resulting	 in	 the	 company	 being	 barred	 form	 trading	 on	 the	securities	 exchange	 (Hines	 et	 al,	 2001).	 In	 addition,	 the	 SEC	may	 take	 civil	 or	administrative	 action	 against	 companies	 and	 assist	 relevant	 authorises	 pursue	action	 against	 perpetrators.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 SEC	 use	 a	 proactive	 approach	 to	enforcement	 of	 reporting	 standards/guidelines	 and	 so	 enforces	 accountability	for	the	financial	reports	issued.			Originally,	 the	 JSE	 and	 the	 South	 African	 Institute	 of	 chartered	 Accountants	(SAICA)	established	the	GAAP	Monitoring	Panel	(GMP).	The	purpose	of	the	GMP	was	 to	 create	 a	 platform	 from	 which	 financial	 reporting	 standards	 could	 be	enforced,	 which	 the	 JSE	 was	 previously	 unable	 to	 do	 (Mittner,	 2002)	 and	 to	ensure	that	standards	were	adequately	applied	by	the	reporting	company	(Hogg,	2004).		During	 2011,	 the	 GMP	 was	 renamed	 the	 Financial	 Reporting	 Investigations	Panel,	 and	 its	 charter	 was	 updated	 to	 modify	 the	 panel	 from	 a	 reactive	 to	proactive	 one	 (JSE,	 2011a).	 The	 FRIP	 comprises	 16	 individuals	 representing	‘preparers,	auditors,	academics	and	users	of	listed	entities’	financial	statements’	(FRIP,	2011,	p.	2)	 to	ensure	the	panel	provides	an	unbiased	review	of	 financial	statements.	 The	 fundamental	 role	 of	 the	 FRIP	 remains	 unchanged	 from	 the	function	 of	 the	 GMP	 but	 the	 operational	 style	 was	 modified	 to	 a	 pro-active	approach	 to	 ensure	 a	 greater	 detection	 and	 correction	 of	 non-compliance,	resulting	 in	a	better	 regulated	market	 (JSE,	2011b).	The	FRIP	still	 continues	 to																																																									9	The	wording	of	SOX	could	 result	 in	South	African	companies	being	 subject	 to	review	by	the	SEC.	Likewise	South	African	audit	 firms	can	be	subject	 to	review	by	the	PCAOB.	This	is,	however,	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research.		
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deal	with	any	queries	directed	 to	 it	by	 the	 JSE	 from	either	 internal	or	external	sources,	and,	in	addition,	 it	oversees	the	random	review	of	financial	statements	of	 all	 companies	 listed	 on	 the	 JSE,	with	 each	 company	 being	 reviewed	 at	 least	once	in	a	five-year	period	(Bowman	Gilfillan	Attorneys,	2011).		The	 FRIP	 joins	 other	 international	 independent	 oversight	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	SEC,	 which	 are	 much	 needed	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 reporting	 scandals	 and	 on-going	financial	 crises	 (Brown	 and	 Tarca,	 2005;	 Malsch	 and	 Gendron,	 2011;	 Maroun,	2012b).	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 benefits	 of	 holding	 the	 company	 and	 management	accountable	 to	 third	 parties,	 the	 role	 that	 the	 FRIP	 plays	 within	 the	 company	itself	 cannot	 be	 ignored.	 As	 being	 held	 accountable	 for	 one’s	 actions	 can	engender	change	(Hopper	and	Macintosh)	-	and	result	in	a	greater	sense	of	self-discipline	 (Roberts,	 2009)	 -	 the	 FRIP	 plays	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 ensuring	 the	company	does	not	attempt	 to	distort	 the	 image	which	 it	 reflects	 through	 these	financial	 statements	 (see	 Roberts,	 1991).	 In	 turn,	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 gives	 rise	 to	 different	 isomorphic	 pressures	 driving	compliance	with	best	reporting	practices.			
2.3.2	The	FRIP	as	source	of	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressure	
Coercive	isomorphic	pressure	The	functioning	of	the	FRIP	can	be	easily	interpreted	as	an	example	of	coercive	isomorphism.	The	panel	 is	not	 the	product	of	Statute	and	does	not	have	direct	power	 over	 companies’	 financial	 reporting	 (see	 Section	 1.6).	 Nevertheless,	 the	body	is	still	able	to	apply	coercive	pressure	resulting	in	isomorphic	change.	This	is	 due	 to	 the	 body’s	 objective	 of	 ensuring	 compliance	 with	 IFRS,	 which	 is	 a	requirement	of	 the	 South	African	Companies	Act	 (2008),	 and	 the	 ability	 of	 the	body	 to	 force	 a	 company	 to	 rectify	 any	 errors	 or	 omissions	 in	 its	 financial	reporting	 through	 the	 power	 obtained	 from	 its	 position	 relative	 to	 the	 JSE.	 In	addition,	 the	capitalistic	environment	companies	operating	under	calls	 for	high	quality	 financial	 reporting	 (IASB,	 2010)	 which	 if	 found	 to	 be	 lacking	 could	negatively	affect	the	company’s	perceived	legitimacy.	Based	on	these	operations	the	FRIP,	as	part	of	a	mechanism	of	accountability,	is	able	to	exert	the	same	force	
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of	 isomorphic	pressure	as	 if	 it	had	been	a	 legislative	body,	and	the	decisions	of	the	FRIP	(from	the	perspective	of	the	company)	carry	the	same	weight	and	force	as	if	they	were	by	orders	of	law10.		The	first	sub-question	asks:		
1:	 Is	 the	functioning	of	 the	FRIP	a	source	of	coercive	 isomorphic	 from	the	
perspective	 of	 companies,	 preparers	 of	 financial	 statements	 and	 their	
auditors?	
	
The	FRIP	as	a	source	of	normative	isomorphic	pressure	The	FRIP	is	the	physical	manifestation	of	the	South	African	capital	market’s	need	for	 the	 provisioning	 of	 accurate,	 complete	 and	 comparable	 financial	 accounts	(see	Malsch	and	Gendron,	2011).	In	addition,	the	body	is	constituted	by	some	of	the	 most	 respected	 individuals	 in	 the	 South	 African	 financial	 reporting	environment11.			These	factors	result	 in	the	FRIP	being	revered	as	a	source	of	technical	financial	reporting	 expertise	 and,	 through	 the	 review	 processes,	 confer	 a	 sense	 of	legitimacy	to	the	corporate	reports	of	the	companies	its	reviews	(Roberts,	1991).	It	may	also	be	the	case	that	adverse	 findings	by	the	FRIP	call	 into	question	the	professional	 standing	 of	 the	 preparers	 and	 auditors	 associated	 with	 those	
																																																								10	It	must	be	reiterated	that	the	FIRP	does	not	enjoy	the	direct	force	of	law	and	is	not	 tasked	 specifically	 with	 enforcing	 compliance.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Issuer	Regulations	Department	of	the	JSE	(taking	into	account	the	opinion	of	the	FRIP)	can	 require	 restatements	 or	 corrections	 when	 non-compliance	 with	 reporting	requirements	are	identified	during	a	FRIP	review	(FRIP,	2011).	11	These	 include,	amongst	others,	Professor	Robert	Garnett,	Professor	Linda	De	Beer,	 Graeme	 Berry	 and	 Cobus	 Grove.	 As	 evidence	 of	 the	 technical	 and	professional	 authority	 commanded	 by	 members	 of	 the	 FRIP,	 it	 is	 noted	 that	Robert	Garnett	acted	as	 the	Technical	Director	of	 the	South	African	Institute	of	Charted	 Accountants	 between	 1982	 and	 1984	 and	 was	 appointed	 to	 the	International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB)	as	a	member	in	January	2001,	serving	 till	 June	 2010.	 Linda	 De	 Beer	 is	 currently	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	 FRIP.	Graeme	 Berry	 is	 a	 past	member	 of	 the	 Accounting	 Practices	 Committee	 and	 a	partner	in	the	Deloitte	Southern	Africa	Accounting	&	Auditing	technical	division.	Cobus	Grove	is	the	CFO	of	the	DigiCore	Holdings	and	has	recently	been	awarded	the	Compliance	and	Governance	Award	at	the	2015	CFO	Awards.	
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financial	 statements	 (Section	 2.2.2).	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 FRIP	 may	 act	 directly	 or	indirectly	as	a	source	of	normative	isomorphic	pressure.			The	second	sub-question	asks:	
2:	 Is	 the	functioning	of	 the	FRIP	a	source	of	normative	 isomorphism	from	
the	perspective	of	companies,	preparers	of	 financial	statements	and	their	
auditors?	
	
The	FRIP	as	a	source	of	mimetic	isomorphic	pressure	The	FRIP	issues	an	annual	“Summary	of	the	outcome	of	cases	investigated	by	the	panel	and	 the	resulting	actions”	 (FRIP,	2014).	This	 is	a	summary	of	all	matters	referred	 to	 the	 FRIP	 including	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 the	 issue,	 the	 outcomes,	corrective	 action	 instructed	 against	 the	 financial	 report	 and	 the	 disciplinary	action	taken	against	the	preparer.			This	summary	of	matters	provides	the	preparers	with	a	 list	of	specific	 items	or	issues	 which	 the	 FRIP	 has	 previously	 focused	 on,	 to	 ensure	 are	 appropriately	addressed	or	avoided	while	preparing	their	own	financial	statements.	The	effect	of	this	is	that	preparers	are	made	aware	of	a	list	of	issues	or	concerns	raised	by	the	 FRIP	 which	 they,	 in	 turn,	 avoid	 (Section	 2.2.3).	 This	 results	 in	 a	 type	 of	mimetic	 isomorphism	 in	 that	 financial	 reporting	practices	which	should	not	be	replicated	are	identified.			The	leads	to	the	third	sub-question:	
3:	Is	the	functioning	of	the	FRIP	a	source	of	mimetic	isomorphism	from	the	
perspective	 of	 companies,	 preparers	 of	 financial	 statements	 and	 their	
auditors?		Before	 answering	 each	 of	 these	 questions,	 Section	 3	 discusses	 the	 research	method.				
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3.	Method	Section	 3.1	 discusses	 the	 difference	 between	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	research	 and	 explains	 why	 the	 latter	 is	 used.	 Section	 3.2	 discusses	 the	 use	 of	detailed	 interviews	 and	 considers	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 this	method.	 This	 includes	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 sample	 size,	 data	 collection	 and	analysis.	The	steps	taken	to	ensure	validity	and	reliability	are	outlined	in	Section	3.3.	 Section	3.4	 summarises	ethical	 considerations	and,	 finally,	 Section	3.5	 lists	inherent	limitations.			
3.1	Research	paradigm	Quantitative	 research	 tends	 to	 take	 a	 positivist	 view	 of	 reality	 and,	 therefore,	attempts	 to	 test	 objective	 theories	 by	 investigating	 the	 relationships	 among	variables	(Creswell,	2009).	The	intention	of	quantitative	research	is	to	‘establish,	confirm,	or	validate	relationships	and	to	develop	generalizations	that	contribute	to	 existing	 theories’	 (Leedy	 and	 Ormrod,	 2010,	 p.	 96).	 This	 form	 of	 research	strives	 for	 objective	 means	 in	 studying	 its	 subject	 matter	 (Broadbent	 and	Unerman,	2011;	Maroun,	2012a).			The	purpose	of	qualitative	research	is	neither	to	verify	the	existence	of	a	rule	or	theory,	 nor	 to	 obtain	 a	 definitive	 answer.	 Instead,	 the	 objective	 of	 qualitative	research	 is	 to	 investigate	 and	 explore	 human	 behaviour	 (Creswell,	 2009).	 The	benefits	 of	 using	 the	 qualitative	 approach,	 as	 explained	 by	 Leedy	 and	 Ormrod	(2010),	include	the	ability	to	review	the	multifaceted	nature	of	certain	situations,	settings,	 relationships	 and	 people.	 It	 enables	 a	 researcher	 to	 gain	 a	 better	understanding	 about	 a	 particular	 event,	 develop	 new	 concepts	 or	 theoretical	perspectives	 and	 describe	 problems	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 recommendations	(Creswell,	2009;	Tremblay	and	Gendron,	2011).			Consequently,	as	little	is	known	about	how	the	FRIP	functions	as	a	mechanism	of	accountability,	 it	was	decided	 to	 use	 a	 qualitative	 approach.	 This	 is	 in	 keeping	with	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 thesis	explores	 the	perceptions	of	subjects	of	 the	review	
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process,	in	a	social	constructivist	setting,	in	order	to	demonstrate	how	the	FRIP	reviews	are	a	source	of	isomorphic	pressure.		In	 contrast,	 a	 quantitative	 approach	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 the	relevance	 of	 institutional	 isomorphism	 is	 explaining	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 review	process	 (see	 Broadbent	 and	 Unerman,	 2011).	 Underlying	 themes,	 perceptions	and	relationships	would	have	been	overlooked,	resulting	 in	a	significant	 loss	of	detail.	 Instead,	 the	 chosen	 qualitative	method	 allows	 the	 researcher	 to	 engage	directly	with	those	involved	with	the	subject	matter	and	provide	the	first	formal	account	of	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressures	resulting	from	FRIP	reviews.		
3.2	Method:	Detailed	interviews	This	 study	 employs	 a	 grounded	 interpretive	 epistemological	 style.	 The	assumption	 is	 that	 reality	 can	 only	 be	 accessed	 through	 socially	 shared	constructs	(Myers,	1997).	Detailed	interviews	are	used	to	provide	us	with	a	well-founded	understanding	of	our	conversational	reality	(Kvale,	2008).			With	detailed	interviews,	the	researcher	is	involved	in	the	collection	and	analysis	of	data.	This	 is	common	 for	 this	 type	of	 research	and	 it	not	a	 threat	 to	validity	and	reliability	 (Creswell	and	Clark,	2007).	Using	detailed	 interviews	allows	 the	subject	 matter	 to	 be	 more	 intensely	 investigated	 and	 avoid	 the	 reductionist	trappings	of	a	positivist	research	approach	(O'Dwyer	et	al,	2011).	The	interviews	provide	detailed	discussions	and	first-hand	accounts	of	the	operational	effects	of	the	FRIP	from	those	who	are	either	involved	in	the	review	or	are	the	subjects	the	monitoring	body	(see	Leedy	and	Ormrod,	2010;	Rowley,	2012).			
3.2.1	The	case	against	the	questionnaire	The	benefits	of	using	a	questionnaire	in	the	data	collection	process	are	extensive.	A	questionnaire	can	be	sent	 to	a	 large	population	of	potential	respondents,	 the	collection	of	the	data	is	easier	and	data	analysis	is	simplified	by	using	inferential	statistics	 (Leedy	 and	 Ormrod,	 2010).	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 proactive	 review	
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process,	 there	 is	 little	 third	 party	 participation	 and	 the	 population	 to	 which	questionnaires	could	be	sent	is	small.	In	addition,	survey	methods	are	limited	by	low	response	rates	(Leedy	and	Ormrod,	2010).	Finally,	as	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is	not	to	generalise	findings,	it	was	decided	not	to	use	a	survey.	The	shortcomings	of	 employing	a	questionnaire-based	approach	are	 summarised	by	Dowson	and	Mcinerney	(2001):	
	‘by	 specifying	 all	 questions	 in	 advance,	 eliminating	 any	
other	possible	questions	that	could	be	asked,	the	researcher	
is	 only	 apt	 to	 gain	 limited	 and	 possibly	 distorted	
information’	(cited	in	Leedy	and	Ormrod,	2010).		
3.2.2	The	development	of	the	interview	agenda	Semi-structured	 (open-ended)	 questions	 were	 developed	 by	 the	 researcher	based	 on	 the	 prior	 literature	 dealing	 with	 technologies	 of	 accountability	(examples	include	Roberts,	1991;	Huse,	2005;	Solomon,	2010),	and	professional	publications	 explaining	 the	 functioning	 and	 role	 of	 the	 FRIP	 and	 the	 proactive	review	process	(examples	include	Bowman	Gilfillan	Attorneys,	2011;	FRIP,	2011;	JSE,	2011b).	The	questions	posed	dealt	with	the	importance	of	accountability	for	the	preparation	of	high	quality	financial	statements,	 the	review	process	carried	out	by	the	FRIP	and	the	intended	or	perceived	effect	of	the	FRIP’s	review	process	(Appendix	A).	Questions	were,	to	the	extent	possible,	non-leading,	and	as	broad	as	 possible	 to	 allow	 the	 themes	 and	 concepts	 of	 the	 research	 question	 to	 be	explored	 (Creswell	 and	 Clark,	 2007;	 O'Dwyer	 et	 al,	 2011).	 To	 further	 ensure	research	 quality,	 the	 final	 interview	 agenda	 had	 also	 been	 piloted	 with	 one	accounting	 academic	 and	 one	 senior	 audit	manager	 at	 one	 of	 the	 ‘Big	 4’	 audit	firms	 in	 South	 Africa	 to	 ensure	 accuracy,	 clarity	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 research	question	 (Rowley,	 2012).	 The	 interview	 agenda	 was	 subject	 to	 review	 by	 the	Ethics	 Unit	 of	 the	University	 of	 the	Witwatersrand	 and	was	 approved	without	any	ethical	issues	or	concerns	noted	(Section	3.4).			
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3.2.3	Sample	Due	to	the	specialised	nature	of	both	the	proactive	review	and	the	operations	of	the	 FRIP,	 the	 population	 of	 professionals	 with	 in-depth	 knowledge	 and	understanding	of	the	review	is	limited.	In	addition,	potential	interviewees	are	all	practicing	 professionals	 with	 limited	 time.	 It	 was,	 therefore,	 decided	 to	 apply	purposeful	sampling	(Leedy	and	Ormrod,	2010).			Although	this	does	introduce	the	risk	of	bias,	the	sampling	method	ensures	that	only	 those	 individuals	with	 first-hand	experience	are	engaged	 in	 the	study	and	that	the	findings	are	detailed	and	accurate	(as	per	Cohen	et	al,	2002;	Maroun	and	Solomon,	 2013).	 Relatively	 small	 sample	 sizes	 also	 allowed	 sufficient	 time	 for	each	 interview,	 including	 follow-up	 sessions,	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 research	questions/agenda	points	were	adequately	addressed	(Rowley,	2012).		Ten	 interviews	 ranging	 from	 thirty	 minutes	 to	 one	 hour	 were	 carried	 out	(adapted	 from	 Rowley,	 2012).12	Interviewees	 included	 audit	 professionals	 (4),	members	of	the	Panel	(3)	and	preparers	(3).	This	ensured	that	the	results	were	not	 dominated	 by	 the	 perspectives	 of	 a	 particular	 group	 of	 respondents	 but	 it	should	be	pointed	out	that	it	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	to	differentiate	the	views	of	each	group	of	respondents.		
3.2.4	Data	collection	Data	 collection	 and	analysis	was	 inspired	by	 a	 grounded	 theory	 approach,	 and	was	 iterative	 in	 nature	 with	 the	 researcher	 moving	 constantly	 between	interviews	and	prior	literature	(O'Dwyer	et	al,	2011).																																																											12	A	 comparable	 approach	 is	 followed	 by	 Hines	 et	 al	 (2001)	 who	 look	 at	 the	experiences	 of	 directors	 and	 auditors	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 Financial	 Reporting	Review	Panel:	they	rely	on	sixteen	interviews	to	obtain	saturation	of	their	study.	Maroun	and	Solomon	(2013)	examining	the	role	of	whistle-blowing	by	external	auditors	 in	 contributing	 to	 the	 perceived	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 auditing	 profession	within	South	Africa	used	30	interviews	of	leading	corporate	governance	experts	to	 explore	 this	 issue.	 Lastly	 Fearnley	 et	 al	 (2002)	 use	 only	 15	 semi-structured	interviews	to	investigate	the	impact	of	the	FRRP	on	the	independence	of	auditors	and	their	attitudes	to	compliance	in	the	UK.	
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Potential	 respondents	 were	 contacted	 telephonically	 or	 by	 e-mail	 and	 a	 brief	explanation	of	the	research	being	conducted	was	provided.	To	ensure	the	highest	levels	of	research	ethics,	respondents	were	guaranteed	anonymity	and	informed	of	 the	 fact	 that	 participation	 in	 the	 study	 is	 completely	 voluntary,	 they	 may	withdraw	 at	 any	 time,	 and	 all	 commentary	 will	 be	 treated	 with	 the	 strictest	confidence.	This	was	done	in	an	attempt	to	ensure	that	respondents	would	speak	with	complete	candour	(adapted	from	Alvesson,	2003).	If	 the	 potential	 interviewee	 agreed	 to	 participate,	 a	 time	 and	 location	 was	established.	 Interviews	 were	 conducted	 either	 in	 person	 or	 over	 Skype,	depending	 on	 ease	 of	 access.	 The	 interview	 agenda	 (Appendix	 A)	 was	 made	available	 to	 respondents	prior	 to	 the	 commencement	of	 the	 interview	 to	allow	them	 to	 familiarise	 themselves	 with	 questions	 (as	 suggested	 by	 Creswell	 and	Clark,	 2007;	 Leedy	 and	 Ormrod,	 2010;	 Rowley,	 2012).	 Due	 to	 the	 open-ended	nature	of	the	questions,	the	risk	of	‘rehearsed’	responses	was	relatively	low,	even	though	 the	 interview	 agenda	 was	 provided	 beforehand.	 This	 was	 because	 the	order	in	which	the	questions	were	asked	was	adjusted,	and	additional	questions	were	asked	when	clarity	was	required	(see	Holland,	2005;	Rowley,	2012).	Before	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 interview,	 each	 respondent	 was	 asked	 for	permission	to	record	the	interview.	This	was	done	to	add	to	the	accuracy	of	the	transcription	 process	 and	 avoid	 having	 to	 keep	 detailed	 field	 notes.	 It	 also	allowed	the	researcher	to	concentrate	on	the	interviewee,	ensuring	focus	on	tone	and	 non-verbal	 cues.	 The	 interviewee	 was	 given	 the	 option	 to	 discontinue	recording	at	any	stage	and	the	transcribed	interviews	were	made	available	to	the	interviewees	 on	 request.	 This	 ensured	 that	 reliability	 and	 transparency	 and	accuracy	 were	 added	 to	 the	 transcribed	 interviews.	 All	 transcripts	 were	 kept	logically	 and	 physically	 secure	 (adapted	 from	 Alvesson,	 2003).	 Time	 was	 also	spent	establishing	rapport	with	interviewees	(Rowley,	2012).					
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At	 the	 start	 of	 each	 interview	 the	 respondent	was	 reminded	of	 the	nature	 and	purpose	of	the	research,	that	there	is	no	‘correct’	or	‘incorrect’	answer,	and	that	all	responses	would	be	treated	as	strictly	confidential13.	As	the	interviews	were	semi-formal	the	interviewees	were	encouraged	to	talk	as	widely	as	possible.	At	the	 same	 time,	 respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 explain	 particular	 concepts	 or	statements	 in	different	words	or	 from	a	different	perspective	to	address	 ‘script	coherent	expressions’	or	resolve	any	ambiguities	(Alvesson,	2003).			There	was	 some	 variation	 in	 the	 sequence	 in	which	 questions	 are	 introduced,	although	each	of	the	issues	in	the	interview	agenda	(appendix	A)	was	addressed	during	 the	 course	of	 the	 interview	 (Alvesson,	2003;	Rowley,	2012).	During	 the	interview	process,	 additional	 questions	were	 posed	 as	 required	 to	 ensure	 that	the	 researcher	 understood	 interviewees’	 comments.	 The	 highest	 level	 of	research	 ethics	 was	 maintained	 throughout	 the	 interview	 process	 (see	 also	Section	3.4).		
3.2.5	Data	analysis	Once	 the	 interviews	were	 transcribed,	 each	 transcript	was	 briefly	 reviewed	 to	obtain	a	sense	of	the	data,	and	initial	notes	on	emerging	themes	or	concepts	were	added.	 The	 transcripts	 were	 then	 analysed	 using	 a	 three-tier	 approach:	 data	reduction,	data	display	and	verification	(O'Dwyer	et	al,	2011).		Data	 reduction	 and	display	 refer	 to	 the	 ‘decomposition’	 of	 each	 transcript	 into	key	 arguments	 and	 counterarguments	 that	 can	 be	 juxtaposed	 with	 the	 prior	literature.	 Notes	 were	 contrasted	 and	 general	 themes,	 categories	 and	interconnections	 identified	 and	 aggregated	 using	 a	 ‘data	 mind	 map’	 (Holland,	1998a;	 Holland,	 1998b;	 Leedy	 and	 Ormrod,	 2010).	 Data	 was	 organised	 under	headings	and	sub-headings	(axial	codes)	informed	by	the	prior	literature.	These	included	axial	codes	on	how	accountability	mechanisms	function,	the	advantages																																																									13	Each	respondent	was	assigned	a	unique	code.	Any	commentary	included	in	the	final	report	was	thoroughly	sanitised	to	ensure	that	any	information	that	could	be	used	 to	 identify	 the	 respective	 interviewee	has	been	 removed.	This	process	was	explained	to	each	interviewee.		
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and	 disadvantages	 of	 the	 review	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 FRIP,	 and	 elements	 of	resistance	to	this	review.	Notes	on	the	different	phrases,	concepts	and	principles	were	 made	 on	 each	 transcript	 and	 used	 to	 summarise	 the	 data	 under	 these	headings	(adapted	from	O'Dwyer	et	al,	2011;	Maroun	and	Solomon,	2013).			Defining	 axial	 codes	 afforded	 structure	 to	 the	 interpretation	 processed	 and	allowed	the	study	to	retain	focus.	While	there	is	a	risk	that	this	approach	could	have	 restricted	 the	 exploratory	 potential	 of	 this	 study,	 this	 is	 overcome	 by	reclassifying	 individual	 transcripts	 as	 new	 information	 emerges	 from	 either	additional	 interviews	 or	 the	 literature.	 In	 addition	 the	 axial	 codes	 were	 also	revised	as	needed	during	 the	course	of	 the	study,	 to	accommodate	any	new	or	previously	 unidentified	 information.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 data	 analysis	 process	was	iterative.	Where	contradictions	or	inconsistencies	were	identified,	they	were	verified	 during	 follow-up	 sessions	 or	 subsequent	 interviews.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	process	 was	 to	 obtain	 a	 sense	 of	 saturation	 and	 not	 to	 achieve	 statistical	consensus	or	a	‘result’	in	a	positivist	sense.	(Follow-up	sessions	were	carried	out	as	 described	 above)	 (Holland,	 2005;	 Leedy	 and	 Ormrod,	 2010;	 O'Dwyer	 et	 al,	2011).		
3.3	Validity	and	reliability	As	 stated	 above,	 due	 to	 the	 use	 of	 detailed	 semi-formal	 interviews,	 the	researcher	 becomes	 integrally	 involved	 in	 the	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis	process	(Leedy	and	Ormrod,	2010).	This	means	the	study	is	subjective.	This	is	an	inherent	characteristic	of	the	chosen	method	and	not,	in	itself,	a	threat	to	validity	or	 reliability14	(Creswell	 and	 Clark,	 2007).	 On	 the	 contrary,	 by	 exploring	 the	subjective	views	of	a	sample	of	 informed	respondents,	the	researcher	is	able	to																																																									14	It	should	be	noted	the	use	of	‘validity’	and	‘reliability’	does	not	have	the	same	meanings	 as	 one	would	 expect	 to	 see	 in	 a	 positivist	 research	 context.	 From	 a	positivist	 perspective,	 validity	 would	 mean	 ‘how	 well	 the	 measurement	instrument	 measures	 what	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 measure’	 while	 reliability	 would	mean	 ‘the	 consistency	with	which	 a	measuring	 instrument	 yields	 a	 consistent	result’	(Leedy	and	Ormrod,	2010,	p.	91)	However,	for	the	purpose	of	this	study,	and	in	an	interpretive	setting,	validity	means	that	‘the	researcher	checks	for	the	accuracy	 of	 the	 findings	 by	 employing	 certain	 procedures’	 and	 reliability	 is	consistency	in	the	approach	used	(Creswell	and	Clark,	2007,	p.	90).	
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examine	 thoroughly	 how	 FRIP	 reviews	 function	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	accountability	 and	 give	 rise	 to	 different	 isomorphic	 pressures	 (Brivot	 and	Gendron,	 2011),	 something	 which	 would	 be	 overlooked	 by	 positivist	 studies	(O'Dwyer	et	al,	2011).	In	this	light,	validity	and	reliability	of	qualitative	research	is	 not	 a	 function	 of	 clinical	 data	 collection	 techniques,	 statistical	 analysis	 and	scientific	 rigour	 (Creswell,	 2009).	 Research	 quality	 is	 ensured	 by	 detailed	analysis	 and	 grounding	 findings	 in	 the	 relevant	 academic	 literature	 (Creswell,	2009;	O'Dwyer	et	al,	2011).		Despite	 the	 time-consuming	 nature	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 research	 bias,	 the	following	 steps	 were	 taken	 to	 ensure	 validity	 and	 reliability	 (Creswell,	 2009;	Rowley,	2012):	(1)	as	discussed	in	Section	3.2.3,	only	experienced	interviewees	were	chosen	to	participate	in	the	study	and	the	researcher	avoided	interviewing	only	 one	 group	 of	 respondents;	 (2)	 the	 interview	 agenda	 was	 carefully	developed	 using	 the	 prior	 literature	 (Section	 3.2.2);	 and	 (3)	 the	 data	 analysis	process	 was	 developed	 from	 leading	 qualitative	 studies	 dealing	 with	 similar	subject	matter	(Section	3.2.4	and	3.2.5).		
3.4	Ethical	considerations	In	 addition	 to	 the	 steps	 taken	 in	 Section	 3.2,	 the	 following	 ethical	 safeguards	were	put	in	place:	
• As	the	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	obtain	personal	accounts,	anonymity	was	guaranteed.	Where	quotations	are	used,	 information	which	could	reveal	 the	identity	 of	 interviewees	 (or	 their	 place	 of	 employment)	 has	 been	 removed	with	amendments	indicated.		
• Transcripts	were	kept	only	for	the	data	collection	and	analysis	processes	and	were	destroyed	after	the	completion	of	the	study.		
• To	ensure	accuracy	of	the	interpretation	of	results,	interviewees	were	offered	draft	copies	of	this	report.		
• Finally,	 as	 this	 research	could	amount	 to	a	moral	 enquiry,	 ethical	 clearance	was	obtained	from	the	University	of	the	Witwatersrand	(Appendix	2).		
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3.5	Limitations	Despite	safeguards	to	ensure	reliability	and	validity	of	the	research,	a	number	of	inherent	limitations	should	be	noted:	
• As	discussed	 in	Section	3.2,	 the	 researcher	 inevitably	becomes	a	part	of	the	 data	 collection	 instrument.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 results	 are	 not	necessarily	 conducive	 to	preproduction	or	generalisation,	 although	such	is	 the	 aim	of	more	positivist-type	 studies	 (See	Holland,	 1998b;	Holland,	2005;	Creswell	and	Clark,	2007).	
• There	is	always	the	risk	that	interviewees	provide	rehearsed	responses	or	modified	commentary	due	to	social	pressures	such	as	the	need	to	ensure,	
inter	 alia,	 political	 correctness	 or	 alignment	 with	 the	 views	 of	 their	employers	(Alvesson,	2003).	
• Although	 the	 interviews	 are	 exploratory,	 they	 can	 produce	 results	 that	are	 highly	 technical,	 making	 it	 difficult	 for	 non-experts	 to	 interpret	 the	findings	(Merchant,	2008).	
• There	 was	 no	 indication	 that	 the	 three	 groups	 of	 experts	 viewed	 the	functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 differently.	 While	 this	 demonstrates	 that	 data	saturation	has	been	achieved,	this	should	not	be	interpreted	as	implying	that	 the	 research	 is	 concluding	 on	 how	 different	 experts	 interpret	 the	functioning	of	monitoring	and	review	bodies.		
• Related	to	the	above,	and	as	discussed	in	Section	1.5,	analysis	of	the	data	is	carried	out	using	a	single	theoretical	perspective.	Considering	how	the	FRIP	may	be	used	as	an	instrument	of	political	power	by	the	JSE	or	SAICA,	the	 relevance	 of	 disciplinary	 power	 and	 control,	 and	 the	 FRIP	 as	 an	instrument	of	legitimisation,	for	example,	are	not	be	dealt	with	explicitly.	Consequently,	while	this	research	will	shed	light	on	the	functioning	of	the	FRIP,	 it	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 a	 complete	 account	 of	 the	 review	function	(Alvesson,	2003).	
• Finally,	 the	 research	 examines	 only	 the	 role	 of	 the	 FRIP	 as	 a	 possible	mechanism	of	accountability	from	the	perspective	of	a	group	of	experts	in	South	 Africa.	 How	 mechanisms	 of	 accountability	 are	 viewed	 by	 non-expert	users	is	not	addressed.		
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4.	Results	This	 chapter	 documents	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews	performed	 using	 the	 interview	 agenda	 provided	 in	 Appendix	 A.	 Section	 4.1	explores	 the	 functioning	of	coercive	 isomorphic	pressure.	Section	4.2	examines	the	effects	of	normative	isomorphic	pressure	as	a	result	of	the	operation	of	the	FRIP	 in	 a	 highly	 professionalised	 space.	 Finally,	 Section	 4.3	 examines	 possible	evidence	 of	 the	 operation	 of	mimetic	 isomorphism	 associated	with	 the	 review	activities	being	carried	out	by	the	FRIP.		
4.1	Coercive	isomorphism	The	 FRIP	 does	 not	 enjoy	 the	 direct	 force	 of	 law	 in	 order	 to	 drive	 high	 quality	financial	reporting.	As	a	result,	it	can	be	argued	that	a	FRIP	review	is	not,	in	itself,	a	source	of	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.	Nevertheless,	FRIP	reviews	can	work	with	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Companies	 Act	 (2008)	 and	 the	 JSE	 listing	requirements	(JSE,	2013)	to	achieve	high	quality	financial	reporting	and	give	rise	to	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.		
4.1.1	The	FRIP,	The	Companies	Act	and	the	JSE	listing	requirements	The	 prescriptive	 use	 of	 IFRS	 in	 the	 preparation	 of	 listed	 companies’	 financial	statements	is	a	requirement	of	the	South	African	Companies	Act	No	71	of	2008	(Companies	Act,	2008)	and	of	the	JSE	listing	requirements	((JSE,	2013).	Having	the	 required	 reporting	 framework	 legislated	 and	 as	 a	 listing	 requirement	provides	a	statutory	backing	for	its	application.	It	is	through	this	backing	that	the	application	 of	 the	 framework	 can	 be	 enforced	 by	 establishing	 adverse	consequences	for	non-compliance.	The	consequences	of	non-compliance	depend	on	 the	 enforcement	 mechanism	 contravened	 and	 the	 severity	 of	 the	contravention,	as	discussed	below.	The	effect	of	having	the	reporting	framework	requirements	legislated	is	summarised	as	follows:	
	if	a	company	doesn’t	comply	with	IFRS	then	they	are	guilty	
of	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 Companies	 Act	 and	 then	 they	
are	basically	breaking	the	law,	(R6)	
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	Laws	 and	 regulations	 are,	 in	 themselves,	 a	 source	 of	 coercive	 isomorphic	pressure	(DiMaggio	and	Powell).	In	addition	to	potentially	material	financial	and	criminal	 sanctions	 for	 non-compliance	 legislation	 represents	 a	 powerful	institutionalised	system	which	contemporary	organisations	must	comply	with	in	order	to	ensure	structural	and	procedural	 legitimacy	(Meyer	and	Rowan,	1977;	DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983;	Suchman,	1995).	In	this	context,	the	FRIP	is	not,	 in	itself,	 the	 cause	 of	 legal	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure.	 Instead	 it	 works	 in	conjunction	 with	 legislation	 and	 with	 the	 JSE	 listing	 requirements	 to	 drive	compliance	 with	 IFRS.	 This	 is	 not	 achieved	 by	 the	 FRIP	 imposing	 penalties	directly	but	by	acting	as	a	technology	of	accountability	in	terms	of	which	it	is	able	to	rely	on	its	data	collection	and	analysis	capabilities	to	identify	poor	application	of	IFRS	and	render	the	individual	organisation	visible.	Consider	the	following:	
Companies	are	starting	to	realise	that	somebody	is	looking	
at	their	financial	statements	and	it’s	somebody	they	can’t	
bully	(R1)	Due	 to	 the	 relative	 position	 of	 the	 FRIP	 within	 the	 financial	 reporting	mechanism,	and	the	legitimacy	awarded	to	it	by	the	market,	organisations	find	it	difficult	to	manipulate	the	panel	(R2).	Coupled	with	the	technical	proficiency	of	the	members,	the	body	is	able	to	ensure	adequate	evaluation	of	compliance	with	the	reporting	framework.	The	technical	rigor	or	the	process	is	likely	to	result	in	a	revelation	‘for	the	company	that	may	not	be	pleasant’	(R1).	Essentially,	there	is	somebody	‘with	the	appropriate	skills	looking	over	your	shoulder’	to	ensure	the	framework	is	correctly	and	consistently	applied	(R3).	
	In	 addition	 to	 rendering	 non-compliance	 visible	 to	 statutory	 mechanism,	 the	operations	of	the	FRIP	make	the	transgression	visible	to	the	JSE,	which	can	use	the	result	of	a	review	by	the	FRIP	to	inform	an	enforcement	decision.	A	primary	objective	of	the	securities	exchange	is	to	establish	the	integrity	of	the	market	by	ensuring	uniform	reporting	and	adherence	to	the	reporting	framework	(R9).	As	such,	 this	 non-compliance	 is	 of	 particular	 interest	 to	 the	 JSE	 (R2;	R3;	R6).	The	review	of	 financial	 statements	by	 the	FRIP	has	established	a	platform	with	 the	necessary	 expertise	 and	 technical	 rigor	 to	 assist	 the	 JSE	 with	 ensuring	
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compliance	(R1;	R3;	R5;	R6).	In	other	words,	the	review	process	allows	the	JSE	to	evaluate	 cases	 of	 suspected	 non-compliance,	 with	 the	 FRIP	 serving	 as	 the	mechanism	for	doing	so,	and	acting	on	this	information	in	a	manner	that	protects	the	 investors	 and	 ensures	 companies’	 present	 their	 financial	 position	 and	performance	faithfully	in	accordance	with	IFRS	(R5;	R9).	Consider	the	following:	
[The	FRIP]	has	 raised	 the	awareness	 that	 its	not	a	 free	 for	
all.	 They	 [preparers	 and	 their	 organisations]	 can’t	 do	
anything	 they	want	and	 that	 there	 is	 this	 risk	of	having	 to	
restate,	 which	 is	 the	 worst	 thing	 for	 any	 company	 in	 the	
world,	have	to	restate	accounts,	and	that	created	a	caution	
for	 the	 companies	 that	 are	 a	 little	 circumspect	 in	 the	
application	 of	 IFRS	 and	 liberal	 interpretation	 of	 IFRS	 (sic)	
(R3)		The	 risk	 of	 restatement	 causes	 the	 organisation	 to	 consider	 its	 application	 of	IFRS	more	closely	 (R5).	 It	 influences	 the	company	 to	ensure	 its	 interpretations	are	 consistent	with	 IFRS	 and	other	market	participants	 (R1;	R9).	Through	 this	process,	the	JSE	is	able	to	ensure	organisations	appropriately	consider	and	apply	the	financial	reporting	framework.	In	addition,	while	the	JSE	listing	requirements	do	not	give	the	Exchange	the	power	to	instruct	a	company	to	restate,	the	JSE	is	able	to	uses	other	avenues	made	available	by	the	listing	requirements	(R3).	The	most	serious	of	these	is	the	suspension	of	the	organisation’s	listing,	as	explained:	
Where	 they	 say	 we	 want	 you	 to	 restate	 and	 the	 company	
says	no,	and	then	what	can	they	do,	they	can	suspend	them,	
that’s	what	they	can	do,	it’s	punishment,	so	that	suspension	
is	a	massive	thing	(R3)	Suspension	 is	 a	 serious	 step	 that,	 in	 most	 cases,	 results	 in	 a	 company	 rather	restating	its	financial	statements.	It	may	be	the	case	that	a	company	refuses	to	do	so,	with	the	result	that	its	shares	are	suspended	(R1).	Respondents	pointed	out	that	 this	 was	 not	 a	 hypothetical	 consequence.	 As	 the	 JSE	 has	 previously	suspended	shares	for	non-compliance,	several	interviewees	felt	that	the	threat	of	
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suspended	trading,	 in	part	as	 	a	result	of	poor	financial	reporting	practices,	has	been	clearly	established.			Adding	 to	 the	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	 associated	with	 FRIP	 reviews	 and	JSE	 sanctions	 is	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 the	 FRIP	 and	 the	 JSE	 act	 relative	 to	 a	traditional	 bureaucratic	 legal	 system	 (R3).	 This	 allows	 the	 JSE	 to	 provide	relevant	financial	information	to	the	market	quickly	and	so	preserve	confidence	in	 the	 capital	 market	 system	 while	 ensuring	 swift	 punishment	 for	 the	 non-compliant	reporting	entity	(R1;	R5).		The	 negative	 consequences	 of	 non-compliance	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 company	and	 extends	 to	 the	 other	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 preparation	 process,	 as	explained:	
You’ve	got	 to	 consider	 than	maybe	 [the	FRIP]	 reports	 it	 to	
the	FSB	and	they	follow	up,	the	auditor	who	signed	off,	well	
they	 get	 reported	 to	 IRBA,	 and	 they	 also	 get	 reported	 to	
SAICA	because	they	are	usually	CA’s	as	well,	and	they	may	or	
may	not	report	the	IFRS	advisor	[as	well]	(R1)	The	 FRIP	 allows	 for	 the	 individuals	 responsible	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 non-compliant	 financial	 statements,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 auditor,	 to	 be	 held	 accountable	(R1;	R3;	R5;	R6;	R9).	As	with	the	consequences	for	the	company,	the	FRIP	itself	does	not	hold	these	individuals	responsible	for	the	transgression.	It	establishes	a	process	by	which	pre-existing	laws	and	regulations	can	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	individual	accountants	and	auditors.	In	other	words,	the	FRIP	is	not	responsible	for	 holding	 each	 of	 the	 involved	 parties	 responsible;	 it	 establishes	 a	 process	through	 which	 non-compliance	 is	 identified,	 evaluated	 and	 reported	 to	 the	relevant	 professional	 bodies.	 This	 possibility	 of	 being	 reported	 for	 a	 negative	FRIP	 finding,	and	the	consequences	of	related	professional	disciplinary,	civil	or	criminal	 sanction,	 means	 that	 the	 FRIP	 exerts	 a	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	(The	professional	ramifications	of	a	FRIP	review	are	discussed	in	Section	4.2).		
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4.1.2	The	FRIP	and	compliance	with	stakeholder	requirements	The	 capital	 market	 has	 become	 more	 aware	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 faithful	reporting	 (Atkins	 and	 Maroun	 2014).	 Ensuring	 that	 material	 information	 has	been	appropriately	disclosed	becomes	of	utmost	importance	if	the	organisation	wishes	to	continue	dealing	with	its	stakeholders	(Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015).			In	this	context,	many	of	the	new	standards	released	have	been	in	response	to	the	recent	spate	of	corporate	 failures	and	 financial	 scandals	observed	 in	 the	global	corporate	 environment	 (see,	 for	 example,	 IFRS	 7;	 IFRS	 10;	 IFRS	 12;	 IFRS	 13).	New	standards	released	serve	to	provide	additional	information	to	stakeholders.	For	example,	IFRS	7	was	introduced	due	to	the	evolution	of	financial	instrument	risks	 and	 how	 companies	manage	 these	 (Jonker	 and	Maroun,	 2013).	 The	 new	standard	 was	 introduced	 to	 inform	 the	 users	 about	 the	 risks	 the	 company	 is	facing	 and	 how	 these	 are	 being	 managed.	 Similarly,	 IFRS	 10	 and	 12	 were	introduced	 to	 ensure	 group	 companies	 consolidate	 all	 organisations	 they	actually	 control,	 regardless	 of	 legal	 form	 (IASB,	 2011a).	 Consolidated	 financial	statements	 are	 also	 required	 to	 disclose	 additional	 information	 about	 the	consolidated	entities	 to	allow	the	users	 to	obtain	a	better	understanding	of	 the	group	and	its	operations.	As	with	IFRS	7	the	aim	is	to	ensure	more	transparent	corporate	 reporting	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 preserving	 confidence	 in	 the	 corporate	reporting	 capital	 market	 processes	 (Maroun	 and	 van	 Zijl,	 2015).	 Likewise,		IFRS	13	was	released	to	define	what	the	IASB	meant	by	‘fair	value’,	and	requiring	additional	 disclosure	 so	 that	 users	 of	 the	 financial	 statements	 can	 understand	how	the	organisation	calculated	different	 fair	values	(IASB,	2011b).	 In	addition	to	new	standards,	corporate	scandals	and	failures	have	driven	the	need	for,	and	proliferation	 of,	 codes	 of	 corporate	 governance	 (see,	 for	 example,	 IOD	 2009,	Solomon	 2010,	 IIRC	 2011).	 Society	 has	 placed	 greater	 importance	 on	 the	accuracy	or	financial	reporting,	with	the	impact	of	incorrect	reporting	becoming	more	severe,	as	explained:	
If	 there	 are	 accounts	 that	 had	 to	 be	 restated,	 that	 must	
mean	that	the	first	accounts	were	not	reliable	and	couldn’t	
be	used	for	their	intended	purposes,	and	what	does	that	tell	
me	about	management	and/or	the	systems?	[It]	must	put	a	
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question	mark	on	 the	 integrity	of	 the	data,	 integrity	of	 the	
system	and/or	the	way	management	are	reporting	it	(R3)	Similarly:	
Because	of	all	 the	 issues	 that	have	arisen	due	 to	 corporate	
failures,	 there	 is	 an	 increased	 expectation	 that	 financial	
statements	 will	 be	 compliant	 with	 IFRS,	 which	 would	
increase	the	transparency	of	financial	reporting	and	ensure	
management	 are	 discharging	 their	 fiduciary	 duty.	
Transparency	assists	stakeholders	in	assessing	the	financial	
results	 of	 the	 business,	 how	 it	 was	 managed	 given	 all	 the	
disclosures	 in	that	regard,	and	whether	there	has	been	any	
reckless	 trading,	 because	 if	 you	 have	 paid	 yourself	 a	 R15	
million	bonus	and	the	business	hasn’t	done	very	well,	it’s	an	
indication	 of	 poor	 overall	 management	 and	 adequate	
compliance	 with	 IFRS	 allows	 stakeholders	 to	 see	 this…	 I	
think	 having	 a	 policemen	 [such	 as	 the	 FRIP]	 there	 forces	
people	 to	 do	 what	 they	 were	 supposed	 to	 do	 in	 the	 first	
place,	allowing	these	disclosures	to	be	relied	on	(R5)		The	proliferation	of	codes	of	corporate	governance,	in	conjunction	with	the	new,	more	 detailed,	 financial	 reporting	 standards,	 has	 resulted	 in	 stakeholders	expecting	 higher	 quality,	 transparent	 financial	 reporting	 (see	Maroun	 and	 van	Zijl,	 2015).	 The	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 reporting	 framework	 not	 only	 casts	doubt	 on	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 information	 and	 those	 responsible	 for	 its	preparation	 but	 also	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	 organisation	 reporting	 the	information	 (R5;	 R9).	 The	 functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 cannot,	 therefore,	 be	interpreted	 in	 isolation.	 The	 review	 body	 is,	 in	 essence,	 a	 means	 of	operationalising	 stakeholders’	 demands	 for	 high	 quality	 financial	 statements.	Users	 of	 the	 financial	 statements	 are	 provided	 with	 some	 assurance	 that	technical	 experts	 are	 reviewing	 the	 financial	 statements	 for	 compliance	 with	IFRS.	This	is	the	case	even	if	the	users	are	not	informed	of	the	detailed	findings	of	the	 FRIP	 reviews	 or	 understand	 completely	 the	 technical	 details	 of	 the	 review	
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process	and	any	identified	issues	(see	Unerman	and	O'Dwyer,	2004).	Conversely,	if	 the	 FRIP	 identifies	 inappropriate	 accounting	 practice,	 the	 company	 is	 held	accountable	 in	 terms	of	 the	provision	of	 the	Companies	Act	 (2008)	and	Listing	Requirements	 (JSE,	 2013).	 Although	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 organisation	 is	 not	disclosed,	the	respective	accounting	treatment	is	identified	as	inappropriate	to	a	broader	 group	 of	 stakeholders	 who,	 in	 turn,	 are	 able	 to	 hold	 organisations	accountable	 and	 demand	 reforms	 where	 similar	 accounting	 practices	 occur.	Consequently,	 even	 though	 the	 FRIP	 does	 not	 enjoy	 direct	 force	 of	 law	 (see	Section	1.6),	its	review	process	acts	as	a	mechanism	for	identifying	inappropriate	accounting	practices	 and	 improving	 corporate	 transparency	 and	 accountability	(R2).	In	this	way,	FRIP	reviews	are	an	important	source	of	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.		In	 addition,	 although	many	 interviewees	 did	 not	 deal	 with	 this	 directly,	 some	respondents	pointed	out	 that	compliance	with	debt	covenants	or	other	specific	supply	contracts	can	be	affected	in	the	same	way	by	a	negative	finding	of	a	FRIP	(R3;	 R5;	 R9).	 Due	 to	 the	 company’s	 reliance	 on	 these	 parties	 for	 continued	operation,	ensuring	the	quality	of	the	information	required	is	vital	(see	Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	 2015).	 Subtle	 coercive	pressures	 are	present	 to	 conform	with	 the	structures	and	policies	of	 those	on	whom	a	company	 is	dependent	 for	 support	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983).	As	such,	accountability	can	also	be	observed	at	a	transactional	level.	As	is	the	case	with	legal	isomorphic	pressure,	the	FRIP	itself	is	not	in	a	position	to	enforce	or	cancel	a	contract.	Nevertheless,	its	investigative	processes	are	important	as	they	reveal	non-compliance15,	allowing	the	relevant	stakeholder	 to	 act	 on	 such	 an	 instance.	 This	 reaffirms	 how	 the	 FRIP	 is	 an	important	 part	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 accountability	 existing	 between	 an	organisation	and	the	counterparty	to	any	contract	or	agreement	which	requires	
																																																								15	The	identity	of	the	company	is	not	disclosed	to	the	public	but	the	respondents	pointed	 out	 that	 those	 charged	 with	 the	 organisation’s	 governance	 are	 made	aware	of	the	FRIP	findings	and	are	required	to	take	appropriate	action	to	ensure	compliance	with	 the	 terms	 of	 their	 relevant	 contracts.	 (Additional	 detail	 could	not	 be	 provided	 due	 to	 the	 need	 to	 preserve	 the	 confidentiality	 of	 the	respondents)	
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compliance	with	 IFRS	and,	 therefore,	an	 indirect	source	of	coercive	 isomorphic	pressure	(R1;	R5).		
4.2	Normative	isomorphic	pressures	The	financial	costs	of	restating	financial	statements	or	of	rectifying	a	contractual	breach	may	not	be	material	 for	organisations	 in	direct	 financial	 terms.	As	such	the	coercive	 isomorphic	pressures	discussed	 in	Section	4.1	are	not	sufficient	to	ensure	 compliance	 with	 IFRS.	 For	 many	 respondents,	 more	 relevant	 than	 the	direct	 cost	 of	 a	 contravention	 of	 statute,	 listing	 requirements	 or	 contractual	provisions	 are	 the	professional	 implications	of	 an	 adverse	 finding	by	 the	FRIP.	Interviewees	 explained	 how	 this	 normative	 isomorphic	 pressure	 has	implications	 for	 the	 company	 (Section	 4.2.1),	 the	 preparers	 of	 the	 financial	statements	(Section	4.2.2)	and	their	auditors	(Section	4.2.3).		
4.2.1	Consequences	for	the	company	Several	 respondents	 explained	 that	 a	 restatement	 of	 the	 financial	 statements	sends	an	important	signal	to	the	market	which	can	have	significant	implications	for	the	company’s	reputation	(R1;	R3;	R5;	R9).	Consider	the	following:	
if	 there	 are	 accounts	 that	 had	 to	 be	 restated,	 that	 must	
mean	that	the	first	accounts	were	not	reliable,	and	couldn’t	
be	used	for	their	intended	purpose	(R3)	Investors	rely	on	financial	statements	to	make	decisions.	When	the	investors	can	no	 longer	 rely	 on	 the	 information	 provided,	 their	 decisions	 regarding	 the	company	 are	 called	 into	 question	 and	 they	 challenge	 the	 appropriateness	 of	continuing	to	hold	an	investment	in	that	company	(IASB,	2010).	In	other	words,	the	effect	of	an	adverse	FRIP	finding	are	more	significant	than	the	direct	costs	of	non-compliance	with	statute	or	listing	requirements16.	A	report	by	the	FRIP	calls																																																									16	The	 actual	 report	 prepared	 by	 the	 FRIP	 is	 not	 made	 public	 (FRIP,	 2011).	Nevertheless,	 respondents	 confirmed	 that	 restatements	due	 to	 technical	 errors	in	the	financial	statements	are	automatically	associated	with	the	activities	of	the	FRIP.	 In	 addition	 reference	 to	 the	 FRIP	 may	 also	 be	 made	 in	 the	 SENS	announcement	 dealing	 with	 the	 restatement.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 key	
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the	integrity	of	the	financial	reporting	process	into	question.	An	error,	even	if	it	is	 isolated,	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 cast	 doubt	 on	 the	 ability	 or	willingness	 of	 the	company	to	prepare	transparent	and	useful	financial	statements.	As	explained	by	one	 respondent,	 a	 finding	by	 the	FRIP	 can,	 therefore,	discredit	 the	 company	 in	the	eyes	of	its	current	investors:	
I	 think	 it	 stigmatises	 the	 company	 because	 if	 that	 could	
happen	[a	restatement],	are	 their	controls	really	 that	good	
and	then	why	did	it	happen?	…	And	if	it	comes	out	that	you	
had	 inadequate	 controls	 and	 policies	 and	 procedures	 and	
you	ended	up	reporting	false	 information,	 it	will	stigmatise	
the	company	(R9).			Unsurprisingly,	 several	 interviewees	 also	 pointed	 out	 the	 implications	 for	 a	company	trying	to	raise	additional	capital	with	new	investors	and	creditors.	
I	think	it’s	going	to	be	public	knowledge	if	they	put	it	out	on	
SENS	 that	 the	 company	has	been	 forced	 to	withdraw	 their	
accounts	and	 restate.	The	 investor	has	 to	undoubtedly	 say:	
‘does	 the	board	of	directors	 tasked	with	governance	of	 this	
entity	know	what	the	hell	 they	are	doing?’…	Every	 investor	
does	not	have	the	opportunity	to	go	to	the	offices	and	walk	
through	them	and	say:	‘Are	you	running	a	tight	ship?’.	Here	
the	 CEO	 and	 the	 FD,	 who	 are	 paid	 significant	 amounts	 to	
make	 sure	 the	 numbers	 they	 are	 giving	 [the	 investors]	 are	
the	right	numbers,	haven’t	done	what	they	are	supposed	to.	
And	 I	 am	 going	 to	 base	my	 calculations	 and	 decisions	 [on	
that	incorrect	information]	(R9)		There	are	a	large	number	of	investment	options	with	analysts	only	able	to	follow	the	 performance	 of	 a	 select	 number	 of	 companies	 with	 the	 result	 that	 these																																																																																																																																																															investors	to	engage	the	company	directly	when	there	is	a	restatement	and,	as	a	result,	become	aware	of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	has	been	an	adverse	 finding	by	 the	FRIP.	
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institutional	 investors	rely	on	a	collection	of	 indicators	 for	quickly	categorising	the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 potential	 investment	 (Atkins	 and	 Maroun,	 2015;	Atkins	et	al,	2015).	As	explained	by	one	expert:	
	A	restatement	is	a	negative	on	the	tick	boxes	of	many	of	the	
investors.	 You	 have	 thousands	 of	 companies	 to	 search	
through	and	you	have	a	screening	so	[the	question	you	ask	
is]	has	a	company	had	to	restate	in	the	past	three	years?	[If	
the	 answer	 is]	 ‘yes’,	 it	 doesn’t	 matter	 how	 big	 the	
restatement	was,	it’s	off	the	radar.	(R1)	The	 technical	 competency	of	 the	FRIP,	 coupled	with	 its	 significant	professional	standing,	means	that	it	has	become	an	institutionalised	part	of	the	capital	market	system	 with	 which	 organisations	 must	 comply	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 legitimacy	(Section	 2.3.2).	 The	 converse	 is	 also	 true.	 The	 FRIP	 is	 regarded	 as	 such	 a	respected	authority	on	appropriate	 financial	reporting	(R1;	R3)	 that	a	negative	report	by	the	body,	resulting	in	restatement,	is	quickly	accepted	as	an	indicator	of	poor	 financial	 reporting	practice.	 	Due	 to	 the	cognitive	 legitimacy	reserve	of	the	FRIP,	an	investor	does	not	need	to	carry	out	a	detailed	due	diligence	on	the	financial	reporting	practices	of	a	potential	investment.	A	restatement	(due	to	an	adverse	finding)	is	sufficient	to	cast	the	legitimacy	of	the	organisation	into	doubt	and	negate	the	need	for	any	additional	analysis.	The	effect	of	a	negative	signal	by	the	FRIP	is	also	relevant	for	a	company’s	broader	corporate	governance.		Although	 not	 a	 recurring	 finding,	 because	 the	 FRIP	 calls	 into	 question	 the	integrity	of	the	financial	reporting	process	(R3),	it	has	the	potential	to	cast	doubt	over	 other	 systems	 and	 processes	 related	 to	 the	 financial	 statements.	 The	identity	 of	 the	 company	 may	 not	 be	 revealed	 to	 the	 public	 but	 senior	management	and	committees	of	the	Board	of	Directors	are	aware	of	the	findings	with	 a	 number	 of	 adverse	 implications.	 For	 example,	 it	 may	 raise	 questions	about	the	appropriateness	of	the	auditor	appointed	by	the	audit	committee	(see	Section	 4.2.3	 for	 details)	 or	 the	 underlying	 internal	 controls	 used	 by	 the	company	 to	 safeguard	 financial	 resources	 and	 ensure	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	financial	statements	(see	IAASB,	2009a).	In	turn,	this	has	important	implications	
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for	 the	 perceived	 rigor	 of	 a	 company’s	 corporate	 governance	 systems.	 As	discussed	in	Section	4.1.1,	there	is	a	general	expectation	by	stakeholders	for	high	quality	financial	statements	and	an	effective	system	of	checks	and	balances	over	financial	 and	 non-financial	 resources.	 As	 a	 result,	 adherence	 to	 codes	 of	 best	practice	 and	 governance	 has	 become	 an	 important	 source	 of	 structural	 and	procedural	 legitimacy	(Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015).	This	means	that	an	adverse	FRIP	 finding	 challenges	 any	 prior	 claims	 made	 by	 an	 organisation	 that	 it	 is	committed	 to	 effective	 governance	 and	 results	 in	 significant	 internal	 reflection	by	the	organisation	on	the	challenge	to	underlying	legitimacy		(R1,	R9).			In	 other	 words,	 the	 FRIP	 functions	 concurrently	 with	 other	 systems	 of	accountability	to	yield	a	source	of	normative	isomorphic	pressure.	As	explained	by	 (Suchman,	 1995,	 p.	 589)	 ‘organizations	 often	 pursue	 professionalization’	 in	order	to	‘link	their	activities	to	external	definitions	of	authority	and	competence’.	Claims	to	compliance	with	the	principles	in,	 for	example,	King-III	and	the	COSO	framework,	have	become	an	important	means	of	defining	how	organisations	are	operated	 and	presented	 to	 stakeholders	 and	 a	 driver	 of	 normative	 isomorphic	change	(consider:	Meyer	and	Rowan,	1977;	Maroun	et	al,	2014).	The	FRIP	is	an	integral	 part	 of	 this,	 either	 confirming	 or	 challenging	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	company	has	complied	with	best	practice.	This	effect	is	magnified	when	financial	statements	are	restated.	For	example,	one	expert	discussing	the	implications	of	a	FRIP	 finding	 and	 restatement	 of	 financial	 statements	 for	 the	 reputation	 of	 an	organisation	said:	
Because	 you	 never	 restate	 something	 that	wasn’t	material	
that	 means	 something	 serious	 has	 gone	 wrong	 here	 and,	
even	 if	 [the	company]	 thought	 it	was	right,	why	didn’t	 [the	
company]	highlight	it	in	their	accounts…	As	an	investor,	you	
rely	 on	 management	 telling	 you	 that	 those	 numbers	 are	
right	and	the	auditor	confirms	 them.	That	 is	 the	assurance	
process	 on	 the	 underlying	 numbers…	 So	 now	 if	 the	 FRIP	
shows	 that	 the	 financial	 statements	 are	 wrong,	 that	
definitely	stigmatises	[the	company]	(R3)	
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	Respondents	went	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 even	 if	 the	 company	 does	 not	 restate	 its	financial	 statements,	 the	 likely	outcome	 is	a	suspension	of	 trading.	 In	 this	way,	that	 there	 is	 a	 problem	 in	 how	 the	 company	 has	 applied	 IFRS	 is	 still	 being	communicated	 to	 stakeholders	 (R1;	R3).	Consequently,	 irrespective	of	whether	or	 not	 there	 is	 a	 restatement,	 the	 company	 is	 ‘exposed	 to	 bad	 press’	 and	 ‘it	doesn’t	 smell	 very	 good’	 (R5).	 This	 results	 in	 investors	 no	 longer	 wanting	 to	invest	in	the	company,	customers	and	suppliers	no	longer	wanting	to	deal	with	the	 company	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 not	 wanting	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 the	company	 (R5).	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 reputational	 implications	 of	 a	 negative	 FRIP	finding,	 including	 the	 perception	 that	 the	 company	 is	 not	 complying	with	 best	practice	designed	 to	service	 the	 information	needs	of	 stakeholders,	means	 that	there	are	strong	normative	isomorphic	pressures	exerted	on	the	organisation	to	ensure	 their	 financial	 statements	 are	 of	 a	 high	 quality.	 This	 is	 reinforced	 by	similar	 isomorphic	 pressures	working	 on	 the	 individuals	 responsible	 for	 those	financial	statements.			
4.2.2	Consequences	for	the	preparers	Interviewees	pointed	out	that	a	preparer	is	unlikely	to	face	criminal	sanctions	for	non-compliance	with	IFRS	or	otherwise	suffer	direct	personal	 financial	cost.	As	explained	in	Section	2.2.2	and	Section	4.2.1,	the	most	important	implication	of	an	adverse	report	by	the	FRIP	are	the	consequences	for	the	professional	reputation	of	the	preparers	and	those	charged	with	the	organisation’s	governance.			The	 name	 of	 the	 individual	 responsible	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 company’s	financial	 statements	 is	 required	 to	 be	 published	 (Companies	 Act,	 2008).	 One	respondent	suggested	that	this	was	important	for	“nailing	the	person”	(R1).	The	individual	 responsible	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 financial	 statements	 is	identified	 and	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 regulation	 and	 prescription	 (see	Maroun	and	Atkins,	2014).	In	the	context	of	a	FRIP	review,	this	means	that	any	adverse	finding	 is	 quickly	 linked,	 not	 only	with	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 respective	 firm,	 but	also	with	the	professional	competency	of	the	individual	accountants	tasked	with	
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the	preparation	with	 the	 financial	 statements17.	The	 finding	of	non-compliance	also	places	strain	on	the	employment	relationship.	A	preparer	may	very	well	‘fall	out	of	favour’	with	his	employer	and	either	lose	his	job	or	stunt	his	professional	development	 (R1;	 R3;	 R5).	 As	 a	 result,	 that	 the	 financial	 statements	 may	 be	subject	 to	 review	 by	 the	 FRIP	 operates	 as	 a	 subtle	 (but	 important)	 source	 of	normative	isomorphic	pressure.	Consider,	for	example,	the	following	comment:		
[Preparers]	will	always	have	the	possibility	of	being	called	
by	 the	 FRIP	 at	 the	 back	 of	 their	 minds.	 From	 experience,	
people	would	rather	have	it	right	than	even	a	possibility	of	
incorrect	or	incomplete	disclosure	by	the	mere	fact	that	they	
know	there	is	a	possibility	that	someone	out	there	could	be	
looking	 at	 the	 financial	 statements	 (sic)	 (R5,	 emphasis	
added).		Most	 respondents	shared	 this	view.	On	one	 level,	an	actual	 review	by	 the	FRIP	has	a	disciplinary	effect,	resulting	in	self-regulation	and	careful	reflection	on	how	IFRS	is	being	applied	at	the	respective	organisation.	In	this	way,	the	professional	implications	 for	 the	 individual	 accountants	 involved	 (normative	 isomorphism)	works	hand-in-hand	with	sanctions	by	the	JSE	and	relevant	professional	bodies	for	 non-compliance	 (coercive	 isomorphism).	 Similar	 isomorphic	 pressures	 are,	however,	 also	 felt	 even	 when	 the	 preparer	 was	 not	 subject	 to	 a	 FRIP	 review.	Respondents	 were	 unanimous	 that	 the	 potential	 for	 review	 (and	 resulting	reputational	impact)	is	often	sufficient	to	condition	preparers	to	apply	IFRS	very	conservatively	(R2;	R4;	R5;	R6).			As	 explained	 in	 Section	 4.2.1,	 compliance	 with	 IFRS	 is	 part	 of	 a	 process	 of	signalling	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 need	 for	 high	 quality	 financial	 statements	 and	users’	 expectations	 for	 transparent	 corporate	 reporting.	 This	 is	 a	 source	 of	normative	 isomorphic	 pressure	 for	 companies.	 By	 the	 same	 token,																																																									17	This	 is	 the	case	even	 if	 restatement	does	not	 result	because,	as	explained	by	respondents,	 the	 FRIP	 findings	 become	 common	 knowledge	 among	 senior	management,	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors	 and	 the	 independent	 committees	 of	 the	Board	
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demonstrating	a	command	of	IFRS	and	a	stakeholder-centric	reporting	model	is	a	 defining	 feature	 of	 a	 competent	 professional	 accountant	 (Fogarty,	 1992;	Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015)	 .	As	a	result,	the	possibility	of	a	review	by	the	FRIP	and	 a	 negative	 finding,	 even	 if	 this	 is	 remote,	 is	 often	 sufficient	 to	 encourage	preparers	to	review	the	application	of	IFRS	to	complex	transactions,	consult	with	peers,	and	seek	the	advice	of	their	auditors.	
Most	 of	 us	 make	 sure	 that	 standards	 are	 being	 complied	
with.	 We	 consult	 [with	 the	 audit	 firm’s	 technical	
department]	and	make	sure	that	whatever	comments	come	
back	 from	 the	 technical	 department	 are	 looked	 at	 more	
closely	than	they	would	have	been	in	the	past	because,	 in	a	
way,	the	JSE	would	be	looking	as	well	(R5)	FRIP	 reviews	 also	 affect	 how	 preparers	 interact	 with	 their	 auditors	 when	 the	latter	detect	errors	in	the	accounting	records	as	part	of	the	normal	audit	process.	For	example,	one	interviewee,	explaining	how	a	company’s	preparers	respond	to	difference	detected	during	an	audit	pointed	out	that:	
I	 think	 that	 [FRIP	 reviews]	 have	 made	 people	 a	 bit	 more	
aware	in	terms	of	the	questions	that	could	be	asked	and	the	
level	 that	people	do	go	 into	when	 looking	at	 the	 financials.	
So,	 I	 think	 that,	 any	 issue	or	debate	 that	would’ve	been	an	
audit	difference	as	a	disclosure	issue	and	would’ve	been	left	
unadjusted	 because	 it	 wasn’t	 material	 is	 looked	 at	 more	
carefully.	 If	 it	can	be	done	right,	rather	do	 it	as	opposed	to	
just	leaving	it	unless	it	is	really	impossible.	(R5)	This	 comment	 suggests	 that	 preparers	 rely	 on	 materiality	 to	 justify	 not	complying	precisely	with	the	requirements	of	IFRS	(see	Tremblay	and	Gendron,	2011;	 Maroun	 and	 van	 Zijl,	 2015).	 FRIP	 reviews	 address	 this	 commonly	 used	method	of	resisting	corporate	reporting	prescriptions.	Most	interviewees	agreed	that	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 FRIP	 questioning	 a	 company’s	 application	 of	 IFRS	 is	making	preparers	 less	 likely	 to	dismiss	differences	detected	by	auditors	on	 the	grounds	that	these	are	immaterial	(R6).		
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Respondents	 also	 identified	 normative	 isomorphic	 pressure	 being	 exerted	 on	those	 charged	 with	 governance,	 in	 particular,	 organisations’	 audit	 committee	chairmen.	The	main	reason	for	this	is	that	communications	between	then	JSE	and	the	company	are	usually	addressed	to	the	chairman	of	the	audit	committee	(R1;	R3;	R5;	R6).	This	means	 that	 the	 reputational	 risks	 for	preparers,	 as	discussed	earlier,	apply	equally	to	the	Chairs	of	audit	committees.	That	the	Companies	Act	(2008)	specifically	requires	the	audit	committee	to	accept	responsibility	for	the	preparation	of	financial	statements	in	compliance	with	IFRS	reinforces	this	sense	of	accountability.	For	example:		
	[The	 chairman]	 is	 a	 bit	 more	 aware	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
questions	that	could	be	asked	[by	the	FRIP]	and	the	fact	that	
a	panel	of	experts	will	go	 through	 the	 financial	 statements	
in	detail	(R5)	The	result,	according	to	all	 interviewees,	 is	 that	 the	chairman	places	additional	pressure	 on	 both	 management	 and	 the	 specific	 individual	 responsible	 for	 the	financial	 statements	 to	 ensure	 they	 are	 compliant	with	 the	 IFRS	 (R6).	 In	 other	words,	 normative	 isomorphic	 pressure	 is	 reflexive.	 It	 not	 only	 makes	 the	chairman	more	aware	of	his	monitoring	and	quality	control	responsibilities	but	also	results	in	his	holding	the	organisation	and	individual	preparers	accountable.			In	this	way,	the	FRIP	is	part	of	a	complex	system	characterised	by	the	concurrent	functioning	of	normative	and	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.	Its	review	processes	remind	individual	accountants	of	the	importance	of	applying	the	IFRS	with	due	care	and	skill.	At	 the	same	time	the	professional	 implications	of	 identified	non-compliance	promotes	more	active	monitoring	and	review	by	those	charged	with	an	 organisation’s	 governance,	 something	 which	 is	 a	 source	 of	 normative	 and	coercive	 isomorphic	pressure	 in	 its	own	right.	The	 final	 result	 is	 that	 the	FRIP,	even	though	it	does	not	enjoy	the	direct	force	of	law,	encourages	respondents	to	internalise	 the	 importance	 of	 high	 quality	 financial	 reporting	 and	 engage	 in	active	self-regulation	to	ensure	compliance	with	IFRS	(R1;	R2;	R3;	R5;	R6).		
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4.2.3	Consequences	for	the	auditor	As	auditors	are	reliant	on	their	reputation	for	continued	existence	(Chandler	et	al,	1993;	Agulhas,	2007)	 ,	 the	risk	of	having	a	 restatement	on	a	set	of	 financial	statements	on	which	an	unqualified	opinion	was	issued	cannot	be	ignored.	Based	on	 the	 new	 reporting	 standards	 and	 heightened	 awareness	 of	 high	 quality	transparent	 corporate	 reporting	 (Section	 4.2.1),	 there	 is	 an	 increased	expectation	that	the	auditors	will	ensure	compliance.	Respondents	identified	two	areas	of	interest	when	considering	the	auditors.	The	first	was	the	impact	of	the	proactive	 review	 in	 which	 auditors	 are	 participating.	 The	 second	 were	 the	implications	of	 this	 review	process	yielding	a	 result	which	 is	 inconsistent	with	the	auditors’	opinion	of	the	financial	statements.			After	 the	 recent	 financial	 crises	 and	 corporate	 scandals,	 regulators	 have	increased	 their	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 audit	 profession	 (Malsch	 and	 Gendron,	 2011)	 .	This	has	placed	additional	pressure	on	 the	 firms	 to	ensure	 that	 they	discharge	their	fiduciary	duties.	Because	these	regulators	often	have	the	power	to	impose	penalties,	they	operate	as	a	source	of	coercive	isomorphic	pressure.	At	the	same	time,	professional	 sanction,	which	calls	 into	question	 the	 technical	 competency	of	 the	 individual	 accountant	 is	 a	 source	 of	 normative	 isomorphic	 pressure	(Malsch	and	Gendron,	2011)	.	Although	the	FRIP	is	not	established	specifically	as	an	audit	oversight	body,	its	review	processes	can	be	viewed	in	a	similar	light.			According	 to	 all	 respondents,	 the	 FRIP	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 another	 body	scrutinising	 the	 application	 of	 IFRS	 by	 clients	 (see	 also	 Section	 4.2.1)	 and,	indirectly,	 the	 rigor	 of	 the	procedures	 carried	out	 by	 auditors	 to	 support	 their	opinion	 that	 the	 respective	 financial	 statements	 achieve	 fair	 presentation.	 The	effect	on	the	auditor	was	explained	as	follows:		 Researcher:	 Does	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 FRIP	 review	 have	
implications	 for	 the	 auditor	 when	 the	 FRIP	 criticises	 the	
application	of	 IFRS	and	the	auditor	has	concluded	that	 the	
financial	 statements	 comply	 in	 all	 material	 respects	 with	
IFRS?	
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	 Respondent:	 It	 is	 very	 uncomfortable	 for	 the	 auditor,	 very	
uncomfortable	 because	 not	 only	 do	 they	 have	 their	 own	
client	 turn	 on	 them,	 every	 client	 blames	 their	 auditor	
because	they	said	the	financial	statements	were	okay.	That’s	
what	 happens.	 So	 this	 will	 definitely	 sour	 the	 relationship	
with	 the	 client…	 It	 is	 also	 a	 further	matter	 of	 discomfort…	
When	 there	 are	 two	 audit	 firms	 because	 there	 is	 peer	
pressure…	Then	there	is	the	third	element	in	that,	if	there	is	
a	restatement,	 it	 is	an	automatic	referral	to	the	JSE,	SIACA,	
and	 the	 IRBA	 and	 there	 will	 probably	 be	 a	 disciplinary	
hearing.	(R3)	Similar	to	the	discussion	in	Section	4.2.2,	normative	isomorphic	pressure	works	on	 the	 individual	 responsible	 for	 the	 audit	 engagement.	 A	 contradiction	 of	 the	auditor’s	 conclusion	 by	 the	 FRIP	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 practitioner’s	understanding	and	application	of	IFRS	and	the	extent	to	which	he	has	carried	out	the	audit	engagement	in	compliance	with	the	relevant	standards.	In	other	words,	an	 adverse	 FRIP	 review	 is	 an	 attack	 on	 each	 of	 the	 essential	 elements	 of	professionalization:	 technical	 proficiency,	 due	 care	 and	 skill,	 and	 the	 sound	application	of	professional	judgement	(Chandler	et	al,	1993;	Maroun	and	Atkins,	2014)	.	Consequently,	even	though	the	FRIP	does	not	hold	the	individual	auditor	directly	 responsible,	 its	 conclusions	 ‘identify	 the	 auditor	 as	 possibly	 lacking	 ‘	(R7)	 and	 are,	 an	 important	 source	 of	 normative	 isomorphic	 pressure.	 The	possibility	of	being	judged	by	peers	adds	to	this18.			As	 explained	 by	 Respondent	 3	 above,	 in	 multi-audit	 engagements,	 having	 a	professional	opinion	disputed	by	the	FRIP	‘is	especially	embarrassing’	because	of	peer	 pressure.	 To	 paraphrase	 Maroun	 and	 Atkins	 (2014,	 p.	 848),	 there	 is	 a	‘strong	awareness	of	reputational	risk’	which	is	‘magnified	by	the	fact	that	non-																																																								18	As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4.2.2,	 it	 does	 not	 matter	 that	 the	 identity	 of	 the	company/audit	 client	 is	 not	 made	 public.	 The	 critical	 review	 of	 the	 auditor’s	skills	 by	 those	 within	 the	 organization	 is	 a	 source	 of	 normative	 isomorphic	pressure.	This	is	simply	amplified	if	results	are	restated.			
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compliance	 [with	 IFRS],	 if	 detected,	would	become	common	knowledge	among	the	respective	partner’s	peers	and	subordinates’.		As	with	preparers,	respondents	also	felt	that	it	was	not	necessary	for	the	auditor	to	be	involved	in	an	actual	FRIP	review	for	this	normative	pressure	to	function.	Several	interviewees	explained	how,	on	listed	engagements,	auditors	are	aware	of	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 FRIP	 review	 and	 are	 taking	 this	 into	 account	 when	designing	their	audit	procedures	and	concluding	on	identified	differences19	(R5;	R7).	 In	addition,	 interviewees	commented	that	FRIP	reviews	have	the	potential	to	erode	confidence	in	the	attest	function	as	a	whole:		
If	you	are	saying	that	you	need	this	[FRIP	reviews]	over	and	
above	what’s	in	the	audit	opinion	then	that	causes	doubt	
about	the	audit	opinion	(R4)	and		
If	you’re	saying	the	FRIP	process	adds	an	additional	level	of	
confidence	what	does	it	say	about	your	audit	process?	(R6)		If	a	company’s	financial	statements	have	been	audited	and	an	unqualified	audit	opinion	 has	 been	 issued	 on	 these	 financial	 statements,	 there	 is	 a	 reasonable	assumption	 that	 the	 accounts	 correctly	 reflect	 the	 financial	 position	 and	performance	of	the	reporting	entity	in	accordance	with	IFRS	(R4;	R5;	R6).	If	the	stakeholders	 believe	 an	 additional	monitoring	 system	 is	 necessary,	 then	 there	must	 be	 doubt	 regarding	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 auditors	 are	 able	 to	 discharge	adequately	 their	 duties,	 leading	 to	 ‘the	 opinion	 of	 the	 auditor	 being	 second	guessed’	(R6).	In	this	way,	the	indirect	effect	of	a	FRIP	review	on	the	professional	standing	 of	 the	 auditor	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 public,	 and	 the	 confidence	 that	 non-experts	 vest	 in	 the	 attest	 function,	 is	 a	 significant	 source	 of	 normative	isomorphic	pressure.																																																											19	A	specific	analysis	of	how	auditors	are	modifying	the	nature,	timing	and	extent	of	 audit	 procedures	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 increased	 professional	 risks	associated	with	a	FRIP	review	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research.	
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The	 proactive	 review	provided	 a	 reminder	 to	 the	 audit	 profession,	 specifically	the	big	four	firms,	that	‘they	are	not	above	the	law’	(R1).	This	process	itself	could	be	seen	as	a	normative	force,	reminding	the	firms	that	they	cannot	simply	rely	on	their	 relative	 position	 in	 the	 market	 and	 also	 need	 to	 ensure	 they	 spend	sufficient	 and	 appropriate	 time	 ensuring	 their	 clients’	 financial	 statements	comply	with	the	reporting	framework	(R3).			From	 a	 slightly	 different	 perspective	 while	 auditors	 are	 required	 to	 be	independent	 of	 their	 clients	 (IAASB,	 2009b),	 as	 in	 any	 business,	 they	 are	economically	dependant	on	 their	clients.	Therefore,	FRIP	reviews	can	act	as	an	additional	 regulatory	mechanism	which	exerts	 indirect	coercive	and	normative	isomorphic	pressure	to	safeguard	against	threats	to	 independence	which	might	compromise	the	quality	of	an	audit	engagement.			The	proceeding	discussion	should	not,	however,	be	interpreted	as	implying	that	isomorphic	 pressures	 are	 only	 functioning	 on	 the	 auditor.	 Respondents	explained	that	the	proactive	review	by	the	FRIP	can	enhance	auditors’	ability	to	hold	 clients	 accountable	 for	 non-compliance	 with	 IFRS.	 For	 example	 the	proactive	review	can	be	used	to	convince	or	persuade	clients	to	adhere	to	IFRS:	
For	me	it	makes	it	easier	for	the	companies	I	work	for	to	say	
‘look	 it’s	not	 just	me	you	need	to	convince,	 there	 is	another	
regulatory	 body	 that	 can	 ask	 questions’,	 so	 we	 need	 to	
ensure	that	our	disclosure	is	correct	(R2)	FRIP	 reviews	may	 also	 be	 useful	 for	managing	 the	 tension	 between	 economic	dependence	on	a	client	and	the	regulatory	function	carried	out	by	the	auditor:	
It	makes	the	auditors’	job	easier	because	they	don’t	have	to	
take	up	the	cudgels	against	their	own	clients.	They	say	‘look	
you	 could	 interpret	 it	 that	way,	but	do	you	want	 to	 take	a	
risk	 that	 the	 FRIP	 will	 take	 a	 different	 view,	 and	 then	 we	
have	a	fight	with	them,	and	you	may	have	to	restate’	(R3)	In	other	words,	auditors	can	utilise	the	consequences	of	a	negative	FRIP	finding	to	 ensure	 that	 their	 clients	 are	 applying	 IFRS	 appropriately.	 This	 becomes	
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especially	 useful	 when	 the	 audit	 client	 considers	 the	 preparation	 of	 their	financial	 statements	 as	 a	 ‘tick	 box’	 exercise	 and	 are	 reluctant	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	spirit	of	the	accounting	standards	(R2).	In	this	way,	the	normative	and	coercive	isomorphic	pressures	resulting	from	FRIP	reviews	function	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	they	 work	 on	 the	 individual	 auditor	 to	 ensure	 compliance	 with	 IFRS	 and	 are	relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 demonstrating	 that	 confidence	 in	 the	 attest	 function	remains	 valid.	 Secondly,	 the	 potential	 of	 the	 FRIP	 as	 a	 source	 of	 isomorphic	pressure	can	be	relied	upon	by	the	auditor	to	compel	clients	to	adhere	to	IFRS.		
4.3	Mimetic	isomorphic	pressures	Due	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 reporting	 standards	 and	 the	 proliferation	 of	 codes	 of	corporate	governance	(as	discussed	in	Section	2),	companies	are	under	pressure	to	 signal	 compliance	 to	 the	 market	 (see	 DiMaggio	 and	 Powell,	 1983).	 This	conformity	 assists	 organisations	 in	 either	 establishing	 or	 preserving	 their	legitimacy.	 However,	 as	 these	 new	 standards	 and	 corporate	 governance	requirements	are	not	always	explicit,	organisations	may	be	unsure	of	how	best	to	 apply	 them	 (Tremblay	 and	 Gendron,	 2011).	 As	 explained	 by	 institutional	theory,	this	uncertainty	leads	to	replication	of	the	practices	or	activities	of	those	firms	 which	 are	 already	 accepted	 as	 a	 legitimate	 part	 of	 the	 capital	 market	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	1983).	Although	not	a	common	 finding,	 there	was	some	evidence	 of	 the	 functioning	 of	 this	mimetic	 isomorphic	 pressure	 as	 a	 result	 of	FRIP	 reviews.	 For	 example,	 one	 preparer	 explained	 how	 his	 team	 reviews	technical	 reports	 (published	 by	 the	 JSE)	 and	 summarises	 the	 main	 findings	resulting	from	the	proactive	review	process	.	The	purpose	was	not	to	identify	the	offending	organisation	but	to	understand	how	the	FRIP	is	 interpreting	relevant	sections	in	the	IFRS.	This	has	a	number	of	important	implications.			Firstly,	there	is	evidence	of	a	type	of	inverse	of	mimetic	isomorphism	at	work	in	that	preparers	are	identifying	those	practices	deemed	inappropriate	by	the	FRIP	and	 avoiding	 them	 when	 preparing	 their	 financial	 statements	 (R5;	 R8;	 R9).	Consider,	for	example,	the	following	comment:	
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[Published	 findings	 from	 FRIP	 reviews]	 are	 making	 the	
general	 public	 more	 aware	 of	 the	 good	 stuff	 and	 the	 bad	
stuff	in	terms	of	good	financial	reporting	and	bad	examples	
[sic]	 and	 making	 them	 aware	 of	 what	 they	 [preparers]	
should	not	be	doing.	(R5)		Secondly,	 preparers	 and	 auditors	 confirmed	 that	 they	 are	 actively	 reviewing	financial	 statements.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 reviews	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	information	required	by	the	IFRS	is	being	included	in	the	financial	statements	in	order	 to	pre-empt	 interrogation	by	 the	FRIP	 (R5;	R6;	R8;	R9).	As	explained	by	most	 interviewees,	 this	 is	 resulting	 in	 additional	 disclosure	 by	 most	 listed	companies	to	ensure	that	their	financial	statements	are	consistent	with	those	of	their	 peers	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 IFRS	 (R2;	 R5;	 R6;	 R9).	 Finally,	 there	was	some	evidence	to	suggest	 that	 the	FRIP	has	been	elevated	to	the	position	of	an	interpretation	committee,	even	though	this	is	not	part	of	the	FRIP’s	mandate:		
I	 haven’t	 heard	 of	 any	 cases	 where	 boundaries	 are	 being	
pushed.	There	haven’t	been	big	public	debates	or	challenges	
of	the	FRIP’s	 findings…	You	will	only	see	the	authority	they	
have	 because	 people	 are	 not	 pushing	 the	 boundaries…	
People	are	doing	what	they	are	told	and	if	the	FRIP	decides	
on	something	then	that’s	the	way	it	is.	(R8)		As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4.1	 and	 4.2	 the	 technical	 standing	 of	 the	 FRIP	 has	resulted	 in	 a	 cognitive	 legitimacy	 reserve.	 All	 respondents	 confirmed	 that	 the	FIRP	is	constituted	by	some	of	the	country’s	leading	minds	in	corporate	financial	reporting	 and	 that	 this	 confers	 significant	 pragmatic	 legitimacy.	 At	 the	 same	time,	a	rigorous	review	processes	-	coupled	with	a	clear	mandate	from	the	Stock	Exchange	 -	 has	 resulted	 in	 procedural	 legitimacy.	 This	 is	 complemented	 by	structural	 legitimacy	 resulting	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 FRIP	 is	 to	drive	 high	 quality	 financial	 reporting	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 users	 of	 financial	statements.	This	means	that,	in	South	Africa,	the	FRIP	is	generally	accepted	as	a	financial	 reporting	 authority	 capable	 of	 providing	 legitimate	 interpretations	 of	
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IFRS.	Whether	 or	not	 this	was	 intended	by	 the	 JSE	was	unclear	but	 comments	from	 most	 preparers	 and	 auditors	 revealed	 that	 findings	 from	 a	 FRIP	 review	carry	as	much	weight	as	interpretations	issued	by	the	IFRIC	and,	in	some	cases,	are	seen	as	an	irrefutable	extension	of	the	IFRS’s.	
5.	Conclusion	
5.1	Summarising	comments	This	 study	 examines	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 FRIP	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	accountability.	 In	 particular,	 detailed	 interviews	 with	 a	 sample	 of	 technical	experts	reveal	significant	sources	of	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressures.	 These	 are	 relevant	 for	 organisations	 themselves,	 as	 well	 as	 for	individual	preparers	and	auditors.			Firstly,	the	FRIP	does	not	enjoy	the	direct	force	of	law	and	cannot	pose	statutory	penalties.	Nevertheless	 it	works	 in	conjunction	with	other	regulatory	measures	to	 yield	 significant	 coercive	 isomorphic	 pressure	 to	 comply	 with	 IFRS.	 All	respondents	explained	that	the	FRIP	provides	a	means	of	testing	whether	or	not	companies	are	complying	with	the	JSE	Listing	Requirements	and	Companies	Act	(2008)	 which	 specifically	 mandate	 preparation	 of	 financial	 statements	 in	accordance	with	 IFRS.	 In	 this	way,	 the	FRIP	does	not	 impose	penalties	directly	but	is	an	important	technology	of	accountability.	It	provides	the	means	for	data	collection	and	analysis	necessary	to	render	non-compliant	companies	visible	to	the	 relevant	 regulators	 who	 are	 able	 to	 impose	 fines,	 require	 restatement	 of	results	and	suspend	 listings.	This	 is	complemented	by	 the	operation	of	societal	expectations.			Numerous	 corporate	 scandals	 have	 made	 the	 need	 for	 transparent	 corporate	reporting	very	clear.	As	a	result,	companies	are	under	significant	pressure	from	stakeholders	 to	 comply	with	 IFRS	 and	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 are	 preparing	high	quality	financial	statements.	In	this	context,	a	negative	finding	by	the	FRIP	acts	as	a	signal	that	the	organisation	is	failing	to	take	this	fiduciary	duty	seriously	and	 this	 can	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 reporting	 entity	 to	 attract	
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new	 investors,	 raise	 new	 debt	 financing	 and	 remain	 in	 favour	 with	counterparties	 who	 demand	 compliance	 with	 IFRS	 in	 their	 respective	contractual	undertakings.			In	many	instances,	the	monetary	cost	of	an	adverse	FRIP	finding	is	not	the	only	consideration.	 Perhaps	 more	 relevant	 are	 reputational	 implications.	 For	 the	organisation	 itself,	 highlighted	 instances	 of	 non-compliance	with	 IFRS	 call	 into	question	its	internal	controls,	governance	structures,	commitment	to	compliance	with	 codes	 of	 best	 practice	 and	 the	 firm’s	 legitimacy.	 In	 turn,	 this	 erodes	 the	confidence	which	important	stakeholders	place	in	the	organisation	and,	as	with	coercive	 isomorphism,	 can	undermine	 the	attractiveness	of	 the	organisation	 to	investors.	This	is	especially	true	when	the	company	is	required	to	restate	results	because	non-compliance	with	 IFRS	 is,	 indirectly,	 being	 reported	 to	 all	 relevant	stakeholders.			Normative	 isomorphic	 pressures	 are	 also	 at	 work	 on	 individual	 preparers.	 As	technical	 accounting	 experts,	 they	 should	 be	 preparing	 financial	 statements	 in	compliance	 with	 IFRS.	 A	 negative	 finding	 by	 the	 FRIP	 calls	 into	 question	professional	 competency	 and	 due	 care,	 effectively	 tarnishing	 the	 individual	accountant’s	 professional	 reputation.	 This	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 coercive	isomorphic	pressure	as	the	inference	of	professional	misconduct	can	give	rise	to	disciplinary	 enquiries	 by	 professional	 bodies	 and	 lead	 to	 the	 individual	 falling	out	of	favour	with	the	respective	employer.			Respondents	 also	 identified	 normative	 isomorphic	 pressure	 being	 exerted	 on	those	charged	with	governance,	in	particular,	organisations’	audit	committees.	In	light	of	the	fact	that	the	Companies	Act	(2008)	vests	responsibility	for	the	quality	of	 the	 financial	 statements	 with	 the	 audit	 committee,	 the	 reputational	implications	 of	 a	 FRIP	 review	 for	 individual	 preparers	 apply	 equally	 to	 the	chairmen	of	audit	committees.			The	 effect	 of	 an	 adverse	 FRIP	 review	 for	 external	 auditors	 should	 also	 not	 be	overlooked.	 Audit	 firms	 are	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 claims	 to	 professional	
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expertise	and	technical	competency	in	order	to	command	the	confidence	of	non-expert	 users.	 Even	 though	 the	 FRIP	 does	 not	 hold	 the	 individual	 auditor	accountable	for	the	quality	of	a	client’s	financial	statements,	 its	conclusions	can	suggest	that	‘the	auditor	[is]	possibly	lacking’	(R7).	In	other	words,	the	FRIP	can	be	 seen	 as	 another	 regulatory	 body	 reviewing	 financial	 statements	 and,	indirectly,	 calling	 into	 question	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 audit	 procedures	 used	 to	support	 the	 opinion	 on	 a	 client’s	 financial	 statements.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 FRIP	 is	able	to	exert	a	significant	normative	isomorphic	pressure	on	the	individual	audit	partner	and	the	professional	firm	which	is	almost	entirely	dependent	on	claims	to	technical	expertise	for	continued	existence.			It	 is	 important	to	note	that	these	normative	and	coercive	isomorphic	pressures	work	 concurrently.	 FRIP	 reviews	 remind	 individual	 accountants,	 auditors	 and	those	charged	with	governance	of	the	importance	of	correct	application	of	IFRS	in	terms	of	the	Listing	Requirements,	statute	and	contractual	provisions.	At	the	same	time	the	professional	implications	of	identified	non-compliance	encourage	respondents	to	internalise	the	importance	of	high	quality	financial	reporting	and	engage	in	active	self-regulation	to	ensure	compliance	with	IFRS.		Finally,	although	not	a	recurring	finding,	some	respondents	pointed	to	the	FRIP	as	 a	 source	 of	 mimetic	 isomorphic	 pressure.	 This	 often	 takes	 the	 form	 of	identifying	 those	 reporting	 practices	 deemed	 unacceptable	 by	 the	 FRIP	 and	ensuring	they	are	not	repeated.	Many	preparers	are	also	devoting	considerable	time	 and	 effort	 to	 ensuring	 that	 their	 financial	 statements	 include	 comparable	disclosure	to	their	peers	and	include	all	required	disclosures	prescribed	by	IFRS.	Perhaps	the	most	important	finding	is	the	expansion	of	the	FRIP’s	jurisdiction	to	include	 interpretation	 of	 IFRS.	 This	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	 Review	 Board’s	mandate	 but	 the	 cognitive	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 FRIP	 means	 that	 its	 findings	 are	often	 undisputed	 and	 readily	 accepted	 as	 a	 valid	 basis	 for	 how	 particular	requirements	of	IFRS	must	be	applied	by	different	sectors.		
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5.2	Contribution	of	the	thesis	This	 thesis	 provides	 the	 first	 account	 of	 how	 the	 FRIP	 is	 capable	 of	 exerting	coercive,	 normative	 and	 mimetic	 isomorphic	 pressure	 on	 organisations,	 those	charged	with	their	governance,	individual	preparers	of	financial	statements	and	external	 auditors.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 research	 makes	 a	 number	 of	 important	contributions.			Firstly,	it	adds	to	the	limited	body	of	interpretive	corporate	governance	research	in	 South	 Africa.	 Most	 local	 corporate	 governance	 and	 accounting	 research	 is	descriptive	and	 lacks	 the	 rigorous	 theoretical	analysis	necessary	 for	explaining	how	regulatory	bodies	are	functioning	(see	Brennan	and	Solomon,	2008;	Maroun	and	van	Zijl,	2015).			Secondly,	the	thesis	offers	evidence	in	support	of	the	JSE’s	decision	to	establish	a	proactive	monitoring	review.	This	process	appears	to	promote	compliance	with	IFRS	 by	 listed	 companies.	 In	 particular,	 coercive	 and	 normative	 isomorphic	pressure	work	on	 individual	accountants	and	auditors	and	remind	 them	of	 the	importance	 of	 applying	 IFRS	with	 due	 care	 and	 skill.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 findings	suggest	 that	 FRIP	 reviews	 are	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 corporate	 reporting	quality	 system.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 because	 these	 reviews	 can	 be	 used	 to	 hold	individuals	accountable,	they	assist	in	preserving	confidence	in	the	professional	accounting	and	auditing	function.	This	may	be	especially	important	given	that,	in	the	 aftermath	 of	 multiple	 corporate	 failures,	 automatic	 trust	 in	 these	 expert	systems	can	no	longer	be	taken	for	granted.		Finally,	from	a	practical	point	of	view,	the	FRIP	provides	a	means	of	enforcing	the	Listing	Requirements	and	Companies	Act	(2008).	As	explained	in	Section	5.1,	the	FRIP	offers	a	means	of	actively	reviewing	financial	statements	and	interrogating	instances	 of	 non-compliance.	 Resulting	 isomorphic	 pressure	 is,	 therefore,	indicative	of	the	fact	that	South	Africa’s	corporate	reporting	requirements	can	be	enforced	and	are	not	just	symbolic.	For	a	developing	capital	market	–	dependant	on	 maintaining	 an	 image	 of	 good	 governance	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 foreign	
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investment	 –	 this	 might	 be	 the	 most	 important	 contribution	 made	 by	 FRIP	reviews.		
5.3	Limitations	and	areas	for	future	research	Additional	research	will	be	required	to	support	these	assertions.	As	discussed	in	Section	1.5	and	3.2.3,	the	thesis	relies	on	a	relatively	small	group	of	experts.	It	is	recommended	 that	 future	 research	 engage	 a	 broader	 group	 of	 stakeholders	 to	understand	 better	 the	 implications	 of	 FRIP	 reviews.	 For	 example,	 it	 would	 be	interesting	 to	 explore	 the	 views	 of	 investors,	 analysts	 and	 other	 regulators	 to	determine	more	clearly	the	contribution	made	by	FRIP	reviews.	This	should	go	hand-in-hand	with	 additional	 theoretical	 development.	 This	 thesis	 has	 offered	evidence	of	the	FRIP	as	a	source	of	coercive,	normative	and	mimetic	isomorphic	pressure.	Future	research	is	needed	to	explain	precisely	how	these	contribute	to	the	 development	 of	 and	 confidence	 placed	 in	 the	 accounting	 and	 auditing	profession	 in	South	Africa.	As	part	of	 this	process,	 the	history	of	 some	 form	of	monitoring	 activity	 by	 the	 South	 African	 Stock	 Market,	 including	 how	 this	compares	with	 other	 leading	 jurisdictions,	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	More	specifically,	it	would	be	interesting	to	contrast	FRIP	reviews	with	the	equivalent	activities	carried	out	by	the	SEC	and	FRC.	This	could	 include	an	examination	of	differences	in	the	technical	approaches	employed	by	the	monitoring	bodies	and	the	approach	adopted	regarding	the	identification	of	non-compliant	companies.		
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Appendix	1:	Interview	agenda	Questions:	
• What is your understanding of the purpose of the FRIP? 
• What do you believe the effect of the monitoring has been on the users 
of the financial statements and the company itself? 
• Does review by the FRIP increase the confidence of stakeholders in 
financial reporting? 
• Do you believe the FRIP has resulted in an improvement in the quality 
of financial statements issued by companies listed on the JSE 
• Do you believe the FRIP has adequate authority, autonomy and power 
to enforce a higher quality of financial reporting? 
• Does the FRIP, in your opinion, lead to improved corporate 
transparency? 
• Do you believe the FRIP adds a dimension of legitimacy to the 
company’s financial statements? 
• Why do you think the FRIP uses a five-year rotation period? 
• Overall, do you have any recommendations on how to ensure high 
quality financial reports in South Africa? 	
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Appendix	2:	Ethics	clearance	Ethics	 clearance	 was	 granted	 by	 the	 University	 of	 the	 Witwatersrand.	 The	following	is	the	Ethics	Clearance	reference:	CACCN/1092	
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